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Article 6

AUDITING EXECUTIVE DISCRETION
Mariano-FlorentinoCugllar*
Executive branch officials routinely make thousands of decisions affecting public security and welfare. While it is rare that such discretionary decisions are entirely immune from some kind of judicialreview, the courts' role
is often so circumscribed or deferential that in some domains the probability
of uncovering problems through such review almost certainly falls close to
zero. The resulting amount of executive discretion carries considerable risks
along with rewards. Some discretionary decisions undoubtedly benefit from
the speed and flexibility associated with limits on judicial review. Yet judicial review's evisceration as a tool to restraincertainforms of discretion also
makes it easierfor some officials to promote appealingpolitical impressions by
subtly manipulatingdecisions, for others to engage in outright malfeasance,
and for still others to simply fail to correct mistakes. Reliance on judicial
review to generateinformation about executive discretion makes it difficult to
address these concerns because courts routinely define much of their work in
terms of applying the same standardof deference to every case in a particular
class, limiting possibilities to increase the stringency of review in some policy
domains without making the costs allegedly prohibitive. As a conceptual
alternativefor monitoring executive discretion, this Article develops a framework akin to that employed by courts engaged in the "sample adjudication"
of class action and government fraud cases. It relies on the possibility of
systematically auditingsamples of discretionary decisions and making those
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resultspublic. Although the efficacy of such a system depends on the political
context and details of its institutionaldesign, audits have the potential to
sever the connection between the perceived costs of encroaching on discretion
and the stringency of review. They also avoid the potentially distortedpicture
of bureaucraticactivity created by a litigation-drivenprocess. Despite their
value, such audits are nonetheless almost never undertaken by existing federal audit bureaucracies,nor does the legislature seem to conduct them in
connection with oversight hearings. This Article discusses the dynamics
working against these audits, explains how auditing may nonetheless occasionally prove t( be politically viable, and concludes by emphasizing the importance of greater sensitivity to institutional complexities in recurring
debates about the merits of executive discretion.
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INTRODUCTION

The problem is a familiar one. Most laws are enforced to some
degree by executive bureaucracies. No legal system can ever vanquish
their discretion. Even if doing so were possible, it would be madness
to squeeze out every last drop of human judgment from the law's application. Then again, too much discretion breeds its own madness.
Sensitive to this predicament, legislators and judges subject a range of
government activities to elaborate legal constraints.1 Procedural formalities and external court review-ostensibly designed to balance the
risks and rewards of lodging public power in bureaucratic organizations-therefore epitomize familiar legal tasks such as criminal trials
and regulatory rulemaking proceedings.
But not every task. Despite the presence of these constraints in
some domains, 2 the hallmark of many executive decisions often
1 For insightful discussions of how concerns about discretion led to the enactment of much of modern administrative law, see McNollgast, The PoliticalOrigins of the
Administrative Procedure Act, 15 J.L. ECoN. & ORG. 180, 195-201 (1999); Peter L.
Strauss, Changing Times: The APA at Fifty, 63 U. Cm.L. REv. 1389, 1399-1400 (1996).
2 See, e.g., Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 411 (1971)
(subjecting an informal, discretionary decision of the Secretary of Transportation to
judicial review on the basis of statutory language prohibiting federal aid for highways
through public parks unless "no feasible and prudent alternative" existed). Overton
Park set the stage for a substantial expansion in the availability (and stringency) of
judicial review governing informal, discretionary decisions. Id. at 410. But review
remains either unavailable or fairly cursory for a massive range of discretionary decisions involving national security, foreign policy, immigration, domestic regulatory enforcement, public benefits, and investigation or prosecution. See KENNETH CULP
DAviS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 151-55 (1969). Regarding the trope that judicial review should have an exalted role in constraining arbitrary bureaucratic action, see
Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme Than Court? The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine
and the Rise ofJudicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 317-19 (2002); David Cole,
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proves to be nearly unfettered discretion. 3 On a typical day, Labor
Department officials decide what plants to inspect for occupational
safety violations with little or no external review. Prosecutors decide
whom to indict. Treasury officials decide whether to freeze the assets
of a charity because of alleged links to terrorism. Homeland security
inspectors decide whether a Namibian woman will be turned away at a
port of entry without being allowed to plead her case for asylum, and
whose name is placed on a government "no-fly" list. These reservoirs
of discretion persist even in settings where judicial review of executive
branch action is considered a central tool, one that not only resolves
individual claims but prevents systemic mistakes or abuses. 4 Yet the
presumed benefits of discretion have led to a vigorous doctrinal and
5
policy debate about the proper scope and stringency of such review,
Judging the Next Emergency: Judicial Review and Individual Rights in Times of Crisis, 101
MICH. L. REV.2565, 2576-77 (2003); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 461, 473-74
(2003); James E. Pfander, Article I Tribunals, Article III Courts, and the Judicial Power of
the United States, 118 HAiv. L. Rv. 643, 653 (2004).
3 See infra Part I.B.
4 See, e.g., City of Chi. v. Int'l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 184 (1997) (summarizing previous interpretation of federal jurisdictional statute by emphasizing the
Court's conclusion that "Congress meant to hold federal agencies accountable by
making their actions subject to judicial review"); Rebecca L. Brown, Accountability,
Liberty, and the Constitution, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 531, 535 (1998) (emphasizing the alleged role of judicial review in promoting accountability); Jerry L. Mashaw, Reinventing Government and Regulatory Reform: Studies in the Neglect and Abuse of Administrative
Law, 57 U. Prr-r. L. Ruv. 405, 414 (1996) ("The long-term commitment of American
administrative law has been to assure that administrative discretion is structured,
checked, and balanced. Administrative efficacy must be weighed against demands for
liberty and legality, as well as political accountability."). Understandably, judicial review is considered important both because of its role in generating information
about, and promoting the accountability of, executive authorities, and because of its
direct remedial role. Regarding "accountability" see, for example, Michael Asimow,
The Scope offudicial Review of Decisions of CaliforniaAdministrativeAgencies, 42 UCLA L.
REv. 1157, 1239 (1995);JeffreyJ. Rachlinski & Cynthia R. Farina, Cognitive Psychology
and Optimal Government Design, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 549, 587-89 (2002); Mark
Seidenfeld, CognitiveLoafing, Social Conformity, andJudicialReview of Agency Rulemaking,
87 CORNELL L. REv. 486, 509-12 (2002); William Christian, Note, Normalization as a
Goal: The Americans With DisabilitiesAct and Individuals With Mental Retardation,73 TEx.
L. REV. 409, 417 (1994). The importance of providing a hearing and a remedy for
government actions affecting a protected interest, meanwhile, is firmly lodged at the
core of modern procedural due process doctrine. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319, 333 (1976).
5 Voices on one side of the debate emphatically insist on greater opportunities
for highly stringentjudicial review of executive branch actions. See, e.g., DAvis, supra
note 2, at 216 ("The vast quantities of unnecessary discretionary power that have
grown up in our system should be cut back, and the discretionary power that is found
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and in some cases-such as those where a choice is committed by law
to agency discretion under federal administrative law-to almost no
review at all.
This Article challenges the terms of that debate. In the process, it
raises questions about commonly asserted justifications for insulating
executive discretion from external review. The argument demonstrates how the traditional paradigm of judicial review, despite its enduring value, sometimes ill serves the goals of helping bureaucratic
organizations learn from their failures and avoid political pressures
endangering their missions. 6 Because complex public bureaucracies
throughout government are increasingly-and perhaps inevitablythe custodians of discretionary legal authority that can be abused, 7 the
problems arise both in national security and domestic regulatory contexts-domains that have been traditionally treated separately but increasingly blur. 8 The Article then explains how a government agency
to be necessary should be properly confined, structured, and checked."); Cole, supra
note 2, at 2567; Nicole Nice-Petersen, Note, Justicefor the "Designated":The Process That
is Due to Alleged U.S. Financiersof Terrorism, 93 GEo. L.J. 1387, 1420 (2005) ("The courts
should not hesitate to act solely because those stripped of their rights are accused
terrorists."). Similarly emphatic voices take the position in equipoise. See, e.g., Eric A.
Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Accommodating Emergencies, 56 STAN. L. REV. 605, 644
(2003) ("Judicial scrutiny can only interfere with forceful executive action."); Ruth
Wedgwood, Al Qaeda, Terrorism, and Military Commissions, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 328,
332-35 (2002). Similar debates play out in the context of constitutional torts. See,
e.g., James J. Park, The Constitutional Tort Action as Individual Remedy, 38 HARv. C.R.C.L. L. RFv. 393, 395 (2003). At least some of the debate turns on differing views
about the extent to which a larger 'political process" promotes "accountability." I
discuss this infra Part III.
6 Although this Article does not directly address judicial review's role as provider
of individual remedies, the argument developed here is nonetheless relevant to the
provision of remedies by either courts or political actors. See infra Part lI.C (discussing the relevance of the argument to court review of individual cases); Part I.D (discussing the implications of the argument for how political actors deliver remedies to
aggrieved individuals or groups).
7 The focus here is primarily on the type of routine executive discretion, such as
that vested in a prosecutorial authority, to impose costs on discrete individuals or
groups with minimal judicial intervention. Cf Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821,
837-38 (1985) (holding that in the absence of a specific statutory requirement to the
contrary, regulatory agency's decision not to exercise authority in a particular context
where such authority could be exercised is committed to agency discretion). For a
discussion of routine executive discretion, see infra notes 29-34 and accompanying
text.
8 Cf Cass R. Sunstein, Administrative Law Goes to War, 118 IARv. L. REv. 2663,
2672 (2005) ("In war no less than in peace, the inquiry into presidential authority can
be organized and disciplined if it is undertaken with close reference to standard principles of administrative law.").
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can perform quasi-judicial audits of discretionary decisions, akin to
the sample audits occasionally employed by courts in class actions and
government fraud cases. 9 If an auditing agency overcomes the relevant political barriers and conceptual challenges,' 0 it can fill crucial
gaps left by existing mechanisms to generate information about executive branch performance.
Part I begins by describing how judicial review plays a prominent
role in generating information about executive branch decisions. The
picture of executive discretion that emerges in such a system will inevitably depend on the structural features of judicial review. That picture will reflect, for instance, the courts' tendency to balance the
potential benefits and costs of discretion by routinely applying differing degrees of stringency when reviewing executive decisions. Suppose that the issue is the fate of individuals designated as enemy
combatants. Whether on their own or in accord with legislative commands, courts can increase the stringency of review by requiring more
thorough hearings before someone is designated, and by decreasing
the deference accorded to the outcome of those hearings or (in the
absence of hearings) to the executive determinations themselves."1
Greater stringency of review presumably reduces the probability that
someone would be improperly labeled an enemy combatant. At the
9 See infra text accompanying notes 105-07.
10 For a discussion of the proverbial "guarding the guardians" problem, see infra
notes 211-13 and accompanying text.
11 Compare Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 602-04 (1988) (finding CIA director's
power to fire employees on national security grounds committed by law to agency
discretion), with Klamath-Siskiyou Wildlands Ctr. v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 387 F.3d
989, 997 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding, under an arbitrary and capricious standard that the
court understood to require "hard look" review, that the Bureau of Land Management's environmental assessments of two timber sales, conducted pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act, were inadequate because they failed to consider the
cumulative impact of the sales). I do not mean to minimize the subtleties of the
variegated constitutional, statutory, and prudential doctrines on which courts (and
even legislatures) draw when they decide on how much discretion to grant. Separation of powers, deference to national security and foreign policy decisions, judicial
deference to expert determinations of government agencies, and statutory interpretation techniques all figure in this process. Even the two cases cited represent extraordinarily different contexts, and the kinds of discretion involved in the decisions are
also different. The point is that nearly any plausible applications of such doctrines
require (or, at the very least, allow) some consequentialist balancing of the costs and
benefits associated with discretion, and different ways of striking that balance are associated with distinct degrees of stringency in the courts' review of some executive decision. As these two cases show, courts indeed strike different balances when applying
these doctrines, and in the process, they set different degrees of stringency for the
review of discretionary executive decisions.
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same time, greater stringency allegedly increases the resources that
society must expend on the review process and that the executive
branch must expend defending its decisions. 12 If stricter review consumes substantially greater resources or creates a material possibility
of embarrassment for executive officials, it may also chill the authorities from designating individuals that should (in an ideal world) receive such a designation. In response, courts and legislatures tend to
vary the stringency of review governing a given pool of potential cases.
But the assumption that courts should apply the same degree of
review stringency to every present and future case in a particular class
entails its own costs. By forging rules applying to every case in a particular class, courts and legislators can impose dramatic limits on society's ability to learn how executive discretion is used.13 Increasing the
stringency of review for a single decision appears difficult, if not impossible, without sharply increasing costly burdens on courts and the
government. Even if one assumes that existing rules governing stringency of review reflect a careful analysis of marginal costs and benefits, existing limits on review stringency almost certainly augur
problems for society's ability to learn how discretion is used.
Government regulators and private employers routinely avoid
such traps. Instead of reviewing an entire population's behavior, they
obtain samples of it. Insurance companies examine a subset of closed
files to assess the quality of payout determinations. 14 Government
agents select a subset of plants to inspect or accounting records to
scrutinize.'1 This tactic can be easily adapted by a court-supervised or
independent authority to generate information about public bureaucracies. The defining feature of this technique is its rejection of an
implicit assumption that a given degree of review stringency should be
applied to all cases in a class. Despite their relative absence from discussions of how to constrain government discretion, audits of this
12 See, e.g., Brief for the Respondents at 11-12, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507
(2004) (No. 03-6696), 2004 WL 724020 (arguing that further factual development of
the circumstances surrounding an alleged enemy combatant's designation as such
"would divert the military's attention from the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan"); Reply Brief for the Petitioner at 4, Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985) (No. 831878), 1984 WL 566059 ("[R] espondents' submission, if accepted, would allow anyone
to seek judicial review of the agency's decision not to bring enforcement proceedings
under any portion of the Act." (emphasis added)).
13 Moralistic intuitions about the importance of horizontal equity combine with
the content of legal doctrines such as stare decisis to complicate the possibility of
using differing degrees of stringency to review cases in the same class. See infra Part

I.B.
14
15

See infra text accompanying notes 109-10.
See infra Part I.D.1.
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kind are familiar from private and public sector contexts. By providing an alternative to imposing a single stringency standard across the
board, audits can disrupt the familiar, repetitive debate about whether
society deserves greater judicial protection of its rights and prerogatives. Put differently, even if one accepts the executive branch's strident (and often questionable) assertions that the sky would fall if
discretion were more easily reviewed in court, there remains a viable
option for assessing that discretion without incurring the various costs
associated with traditional judicial review.
Nor would audits merely duplicate what judicial review could already achieve, either at existing or higher levels of stringency. Under
quite reasonable assumptions, it is preferable from a social welfare
perspective to use new resources at the margin for auditing instead of
using them to expand deferential judicial review. Audits may even be
valuable in a world where politicians are divided about what constitutes effective performance-though implementing audits under such
conditions will tend to prove difficult.
Admittedly, the case for audits is a qualified one. Political constraints may occasionally check discretionary abuses. As will become
clear, not all types of executive discretion should be placed in the
same analytical category. The case for auditing may be stronger in the
case of discrete applications of legal authority to individuals or groups
than in the case of broad policy decisions that courts have historically
excluded from review under the political question doctrine. 16 Nonetheless, the absence of audits for routine discretionary decisions almost certainly diminishes the capacity of legislators and the public to
detect executive branch manipulation, 17 dampens the incentives of
executive branch bureaucracies to learn from their mistakes, and
makes it easy for key actors in the system to avoid articulating (either
16

See infra Part I.A.

17 Of course, the mere creation of some auditing system does not automatically
solve organizational learning and accountability problems. As Part 11 explains, a great
deal depends on details of institutional design. The impact of an audit system also
depends on the public's response, and the institutional dynamics affecting that response. Audit systems can be counterproductive if they merely provide a false sense
of security-which is in some sense precisely my criticism ofjudicial review in many of
the contexts I discuss in this Article. Nonetheless, the status quo seems even more
likely to provide precisely that false sense of security because it lacks many of the
potential advantages that a carefully-structured audit system could generate. For a
thoughtful discussion of the role of audits and the pitfalls in designing them, see
generally MICHAEL POWER, THE AUDiT SocIErY: RITUALS OF VERIFICATION 123 (1999)

("The audit society is a society that endangers itself because it invests too heavily in
shallow rituals of verification at the expense of other forms of organizational
intelligence.").
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in statutory or executive mandates) what standards are actually supposed to govern executive discretion. The information on bureaucratic performance generated by audits could even dynamically
influence courts deciding how stringently to review government action, or whether such action comports with procedural due process
norms.' Ultimately, audits may also exert an impact on the political
context shaping the allocation of power to government. In principle,
that context should reflect an accountability/power trade-off, where
political audiences may prove willing to see the executive branch get
more power but only if it could be reliably supervised. While the devil
may be in the details, Part II surveys some of these problems and discusses how they might be plausibly resolved.
Part III broadens the focus beyond judicial review. Obviously,
formal judicial review is not the only means through which executive
power may be constrained. Other factors include some combination
of the press, audit bureaucracies such as the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and Inspectors General (IG), legislators, and even
organized interests and social movements drawing support from
among the mass public. As the analysis below explains, formal review
mechanisms-such as audits or judicial review-are often critical in
galvanizing subsequent interest from legislators, the media, organized
interests, and the public.
Moreover, it turns out that amidst the swirl of budget votes in
Congress, committee hearings, GAO investigations of FBI computers,
and IG reports on immigration policy, neither legislatures nor the audit bureaucracies focus on systematically auditing executive discretion. 19 As Part IV indicates, the relative absence of sampling
techniques in the review of executive branch legal decisions may arise
from a conceptual blurring of the direct-remedy and information-producing functions of review, and probably leads courts to under-use the
sampling methodologies that some judges have cautiously deployed in
class actions and government fraud cases. In addition, legislators and
organized interests, like the executive branch itself, may lack incentives to deploy audits or analogous sampling methodologies. This pattern of neglect predictably affects how legislatures bargain over
executive power and review the consequences of those bargains. It
also affects how legislative goals percolate through the audit bureau18 See infra Part I.D.1 (discussing the potential for dynamic interaction between
audits and judicial review).
19 As Part I explains, this means that the audit bureaucracies generally appear not
to: (1) take random samples of decisions in a legal domain involving decisions directly
affecting individuals or groups, (2) assess decisions in accordance with a defensible
pre-defined standard, and (3) release the results publicly.
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procurement fraud and similarly
cracies, drawing their attention to
to the extent that the audit
tangible examples of waste. Furthermore,
to allocate their resources, they
bureaucracies retain some autonomy
their initial role as financial auditors
appear to remain in the thrall of
of auditor of government perand the more recently acquired role
fails to encompass sampling.
formance that nonetheless generally
encouraging, it does suggest that
While this picture is not immediately
autonomy, they may be able to
as audit bureaucracies expand their
of executive discretion if agency
entice a constituency to value audits
goal.
leaders choose to pursue such a
to enhance the organizational
Even in the face of such efforts
the preceding factors may noneautonomy of the audit bureaucracies,
institutional responses to seritheless continue locking in suboptimal
also makes it easier for advocates
ous legal problems. The status quo
kinds of arguments for limitof executive power to confound different
on concerns about the practical buring external review-those based
those based on structural,
dens associated with judicial review, and
with doctrines such those
separation of powers concerns associated
political questions. In response, this
governing the review of so-called
aims to clarify matters by focusing
case study and thought experiment
arise in connection with existing
on three recurring challenges that
(1) the importance of recogniz(sub-optimal) institutional responses:
judicial review as a means of
ing the inherent limitations of traditional
(2) the value of envisioning new inmanaging government discretion,
more effectively, and (3) the
stitutional designs to manage discretion
implement those designs in a politineed for reasonable strategies to
those challenges, this Article
cally complicated world. To address
solutions, and to shed light on
seeks to broaden the scope of potential
of whether those solutions
the forces that shape public perceptions
even exist.

1.

DISCRETION
THE CASE FOR AUDITING EXECUTiVE

A.

Definitions

of legal flexibility to use
Discretion can be defined as the extent
branch officials-including,
government power vested in executive
and
budgets, information,
20 Governbut not limited to, power over personnel,
world.
the
affect
to
legallysanctioned coercive authority
recdifferent types of discretion, one might
20 Among the nuances distinguishing
permits
law
the
de jure amount of flexibility
ognize a distinction between the actual,
of
discretion), and the de facto amount
executive
routine
(as in the examples of
almost
or
that review of a given decision is limited
discretion that results from the fact
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I/

every
measure of discretion virtually
ment officials exercise a certain
rarely
are
government actions
time they do something. Though
Consediscretion ever entirely absent.
purely discretionary, neither is
relaare
discretion
of executive
quently, distinctions in the amount
to
tend
over
and policymakers fight
tive. The distinctions that lawyers
relaor
executive branch relatively more,
be about whether to give the
the conto a certain baseline. Outside
tively less discretion compared
lawyers, judges, and scholars
text of the political question doctrine,
that baseline
activity have 2understood
1
focusing on federal regulatory
of executive action.
to include court review
have long acknowlAt the same time, courts and commentators
baseline. Thus,2
that
deviations from
edged the importance of some
Inc. v. Volp
Park,
Overton
Citizens to Preserve
of
case
classic
the
while
as a
scrutiny of a discretionary decision
firmly establishes close judicial
23 other cases in
executive decisions,
presumptive means of policing
a
an equally compelling case for
the administrative law canon make
recIn some cases the Court famously
greater measure of discretion.
left,
government authority best
ognized the existence of domains of
structure, entirely to the elected
for reasons of constitutional
a some2 4 In contrast to this "political question discretion,"
branches.
involving situations
in the context of police searches
entirely absent (as may occur
policed through
not
are
and therefore
that do not give rise to criminal proceedings focus of the argument is on the former
the primary
the exclusionary rule). Although
also has implications for the latter-because
analysis
present
the
discretion,
type of
change policyrnakers' and

mechanisms may
expanding the range of available review
of de
review that could change the extent
impose
to
legal interpreters' willingness
facto discretion.
on pre387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967) (relying
21 See, e.g., Abbott Labs. v. Gardner,
states,
the
from
examples
For
administrative law).
sumption of reviewability in federal
(acknowl1995)
(Alaska
1370
1365,
Meyer, 906 P.2d
see State Dep't of Fish & Game v.
reviewable); Minn. Pub. Interest Research
presumed
is
action
agency
final
edging that
(recogniz237 N.W.2d 375, 379 (Minn. 1975)
Group v. Minn. Envtl. Quality Council,
decisions); Pisano v. Shil-

state administrative
state
ing presumption of reviewability for
1992) (presuming reviewability of
(Wyo.
1138-39
1136,
linger, 835 P.2d
judicial
of
design
of how the institutional
administrative action). For a discussion
the review of administrative action, see
for
provides
review in the European Union
in EC Law-Some Reflections on the Origins
generally Jurgen Schwarze, Judicial Review
& CoMP. L.Q. 17, 22-27 (2002).
and the Actual Legal Situation, 51 INT'L
22 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
23 Id. at 410.
(1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803). As I acknowlto)
24 See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
contexts where discretion does (and ought
that
edge below, there may indeed be some
simply
is
or anyone else. My suggestion
mean no review-from courts, auditors,
the rationales for that kind of
in considering
we ought to proceed with great caution
that the rationales for limiting or
recognize
to
ought
we
discretion. In particular,
not necessarily speak to the question

do
even barring judicial review in some contexts
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as
exists that could be described
what different form of discretion
was
that
discretion
of
form
this
"routine executive discretion." It is
25
Heckler v. Chaney, where the
case,
canonical
another
of
the subject
degree of judicial scrutiny of a reguCourt considered the appropriate
26
decisions and emphasized
latory agency's discretionary enforcement
in such matters by analogizthe value of limiting judicial intervention
in
discretion to prosecutorial discretion
ing regulatory enforcement
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[T] he present conflict rages over questions that at heart involve
problems of statutory construction and cost accounting: whether an
operating deficit in the auxiliary or supporting activities is a legitimate cost in maintaining and operating the Canal for purpose of
the toll formula. These are matters on which experts may disagree;
they involve nice issues of judgment and choice, which require the
32
exercise of informed discretion.

Even when lawyers advocating on behalf of executive power echo
the Court in extolling the value of such Chaney-type executive discretion, they nonetheless tend to implicitly accept a baseline state of the
world where courts play a significant role in reviewing government
action. 33 Such recognition of the value of judicial supervision is a familiar one in the United States and in most other developed nations
(and many developing ones).3 4 In criminal prosecutions, voting
rights cases, and labor law injunctions, for example, the completion of
some action of the executive branch (such as subjecting someone to
the detriments associated with being convicted of a crime) is conditioned on judicial approval. Observers and policymakers may diverge
on how easy it should be for a court to impose a labor injunction or to
convict a defendant. But if they fail in persuading the legislature to
water down the substantive standard that applies, advocates of discre32

Id. at 317 (citing New York v. United States, 331 U.S. 284, 335 (1947)).

33 See, e.g., Brief for the Respondents, supra note 12, at 25. The government's
language in the brief is typical of the positions that lawyers for the executive branch
have taken in this Administration-and not dramatically different (on the core issue
of deference)-from that taken by lawyers for other presidential administrations. It
states:
As this Court has observed, "courts traditionally have been reluctant to
intrude upon the authority of the Executive in military and national security
affairs." The customary deference that courts afford the Executive in matters of military affairs is especially warranted in this context.
A commander's wartime determination that an individual is an enemy
combatant is a quintessentially military judgment, representing a core exercise of the Commander-in-Chief authority....
Especially in the course of hostilities, the military through its operations
and intelligence-gathering has an unmatched vantage point from which to
learn about the enemy and make judgments as to whether those seized during a conflict are friend or foe.
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Dep't of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 530 (1988)).
34 This statement should not obscure the massive extent of variation among legal
systems, many of which assign quite different roles to judicial institutions. The point
is that it is quite common for those different systems to assign considerable importance to the goal of reviewing executive action through courts. See generally AnneMarie Slaughter, A Typology of TransjudicialCommunication,29 U. RICH. L. REv. 99, 101
(1994) (recognizing differences in the "form, function, and degree of reciprocal engagement" among legal systems).
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tion are left to mount a vigorous case before a court that is quite persistently unwilling to simply defer to executive discretion. Even when
such review does not occur in advance of government action, the executive branch presumably labors in the shadow of the embarrassing
possibility that a license grant, a regulatory rule, a criminal conviction,
or a fine will be subsequently invalidated. 35 These realities imply that
we can measure the benefits of executive discretion against a baseline
of relatively intrusive judicial review. 36 We can also assess the potential benefits of alternative means of reviewing routine discretionary
actions-such as random audits of those decisions-by comparing
those alternatives to the existing framework of traditional judicial
review.
B.

Examples of Routine Executive Discretion

As a prelude to understanding the case for an alternative means
of review, consider two categories of routine executive discretion involving bureaucratic flexibility to use legal authority affecting individuals and groups. Though observers may argue about the prescriptive
merits of lodging so much discretion in the bureaucracy, neither category reflects a judicial decision to exercise restraint on account of the
political question doctrine or structural separation of powers ratio35 Actually measuring the precise impact of review with some analytical clarity is
enormously complex, but a number of scholars have made convincing arguments to
this effect using qualitative or quantitative methodologies in different contexts. For
some cogent examples, see JEVRY L. MASHAW & DAVID HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR
AUTO SAFE-W 147-71 (1990) (suggesting that the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's reliance on costly recalls of questionable safety effects rather than prospective rulemaking has in part been driven by the impact of intrusive judicial review
in rulemaking); Brandice Canes-Wrone, BureaucraticDecisions and the Composition of the
Lower Courts, 47 AM. J. POL. Sci. 205, 212-13 (2003) (analyzing whether changes in the
ideological composition of lower courts affected decisions of the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers to grant permits for development of wetlands, and finding that a standard
deviation increase in estimated pro-environmental ideology of the lower courts decreased the probability that the Corps would grant a permit by fourteen percent);
Thomas 0. McGarity, The Courts and the Ossification of Rulemaking: A Response to Professor Seidenfeld, 75 TEX. L. REV. 525, 528 (1997) (discussing the impact of the "ossification" of rulemaking, where judicial review, among other factors, shapes agencies'
willingness to use regulatory authority).
36 Moreover, there is no good reason to expect that courts or legislators routinely
strike the proper balance (under almost any defensible definition of "proper") when
they police discretion outside the context of separation of powers and the political
question doctrine. My claim is this: at a minimum, Chaney-type discretion directly
affecting individuals and justified on consequentialist grounds concentrates great
power in executive authorities and raises questions about the appropriate extent of
bureaucratic flexibility that should be permitted.
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nales. 7 Instead, what these examples tend to reflect is a pragmatic
calculus in judicial opinions, or encompassed by legislative enactments subject to judicial interpretation.
1.

Example # 1: Generally Unreviewable Executive Decisions

A small but important class of executive decisions are subject only
to the barest degree of judicial review. In federal administrative law,
certain activities are described (in a somewhat tautological fashion) as
being committed by law to agency discretion. Chaney itself is a classic
example. Death row inmates were thwarted in their quest to force the
FDA into blocking state prison authorities from using drugs for an
unapproved purpose consisting of execution.3 8 But analysts have long
understood how the case's larger implications lie beyond its unusual
facts. 39 The case cements a barrier to review of bureaucratic decisions
involving the nonenforcement (or enforcement) of regulatory mandates. As the situation for the death row inmates readily illustrates,
decisions involving how to enforce legal mandates (e.g., involving
prohibitions on the unapproved use of pharmaceutical products) can
have effects on some individuals and groups as coercive as decisions
regarding the substance of a regulatory or statutory mandate itself
(e.g., for what uses a product is approved).
Yet the case also hints at the practical problems that would ensue
from a full judicialization of agency enforcement discretion. It borders on madness for courts (or legislatures) to allow protracted litigation whenever a party is aggrieved by its decision to enforce legal
mandates in a manner other than how the litigant believes the agency
should. 40 As the Chaney Court readily appreciated, a similar problem
37 The invocation of such doctrines could also be scrutinized and subjected to
criticism, but such an inquiry is beyond the scope of the present Article.
38 Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 823-28 (1985).
39 See, e.g., Ronald M. Levin, Understanding Unreviewability in Administrative Law,
74 MINN. L. REV. 689, 692 (1990); Cass R. Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Inaction After
Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. Cm.L. Rrv. 653, 654 (1985). For an insightful pre- Chaney
perspective on reviewability, see generally Harvey Saferstein, Nonreviewability: A Functional Analysis of "Committed to Agency Discretion," 82 HARV. L. REV. 367 (1968).
40 See Chancy, 470 U.S. at 831-32 ("[Aln agency decision not to enforce often
involves a complicated balancing of a number of factors which are peculiarly within its
expertise.... An agency generally cannot act against each technical violation of the
statute it is charged with enforcing. The agency is far better equipped than the courts
to deal with the many variables involved in the proper ordering of its priorities.").
From the Court's perspective, matters would have been different if legislators explicitly crafted statutes to require such review. See id. at 832-33 ("[T]he decision is only
presumptively unreviewable; the presumption may be rebutted where the substantive
statute has provided guidelines for the agency to follow in exercising its enforcement
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arises in the context of prosecutorial discretion of federal, state, and
local criminal justice authorities. 4 I And a similar conclusion is
reached by courts in that context: the system would break down if
stringent court review of prosecutorial charging decisions (or declinations) became anything other than exceedingly rare-available only
in exceptional circumstances, if at all. 4 2 Indeed, courts have recursively found that prosecutors harbor an inherent power to choose
43
whom to charge with few (if any) judicially imposed constraints.
Courts are rarely entirely absent from reviewing discretionary actions. Judges and the legislators who shape the relevant statutory
mandates may pull back from the brink of concluding that they will
reject any possible claim associated with an ostensibly unreviewable
decision. The law says, for example, that the CIA Director has authority to fire employees for being national security risks. 44 It also says he
has the power to define what "national security risk" means, which lets
him arbitrarily fire someone for being gay (he has).45 The decision of
the CIA Director is, however, subject to limited constitutional review. 46 Even when all or most alternative review is precluded, courts
can restrain egregious government conduct of some kinds, such as
powers."). Absent some exceptional circumstances, they would be loath to do so. Cf
Bowen v. Mich. Acad. of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 675 (1986) (bolstering a
conclusion that Congress had deliberately precluded judicial review of the amount of
Medicare Part B claims in order to "'avoid overloading the courts' with 'trivial matters,' a consequence which would 'unduly ta[x]' the federal court system with 'little
real value' to be received by participants in the program" (quoting United States v.
Erika, Inc., 456 U.S. 201, 210 n.13 (1982))).
41 See Chaney, 470 U.S. at 831 ("This Court has recognized on several occasions
over many years that an agency's decision not to prosecute or enforce ...is a decision
generally committed to an agency's absolute discretion."); id. at 834 (concluding that
the court of appeals erred in finding inapplicable the "principle of absolute
prosecutorial discretion").
42 See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996); United States v.
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182 (1967). For an
insightful doctrinal review, see Lara Beth Sheer, ProsecutorialDiscretion, 86 GEO. L.J.
1353 (1998).
43 Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 464. As Davis cogently observed, "[a] judicial trial is an
acceptance of a prosecutor's decision to prosecute, not a review of it. Even a quick
finding of not guilty may leave untouched the harms that flow from the prosecution."
DAVIS, supra note 2, at 209 n.21.
44 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 403-404a(e) (West Supp. 2006).
45 Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 602-04 (1988).
46 A variety of practical problems for the claimant, beginning with discovery and
exacerbated by courts' tendency to defer to executive branch national security decisions, make it doubtful this avenue for review would exert much of an effect on the
behavior of the agency's leadership.
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those that might give rise to viable constitutional tort claims. 47 But
the sliver of review available in the context of federal constitutional
claims (or similar claims based on state law) does not change an enduring reality: bureaucratic decisionmakers retain nearly unfettered
freedom from review in a bewildering range of contexts directly affecting individuals and groups, involving regulatory enforcement,
prosecutorial discretion, and national security authority. Defenders of
existing limits may offer defensible rationales for not subjecting these
domains to routine judicial review or its equivalent. 48 But the limits
on review also engender a series of risks, discussed in more detail
below.
2.

Example # 2: Highly Deferential Review

Despite the fact that some decisions are formally committed to
agency discretion, most of the time legislators consider regulatory actions too important to commit entirely to agency discretion. Instead
they create procedural mandates-such as the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) 49-to restrain the scope of executive discretion. In
still other cases, courts interpret constitutional provisions and statutory mandates to impose procedural obligations on executive bureaucracies.50 While procedural requirements help determine the
distribution of scarce political and legal resources among political and
legal decisionmakers, at times the constraints they impose turn out to
be milder than they first appear. The constraints then become part of
a system of de facto discretion. Despite the formal availability of review, the meager extent to which decisions are actually scrutinized exacerbates certain risks-of mistakes, politically motivated self-dealing,
and outright malfeasance-while often making it more difficult for
external legislative or media-driven checks on executive discretion to
operate. 51 The following two examples-featuring the contexts of national security as well as domestic regulation-illustrate the dynamic.
47 See, e.g., Peter M. Shane, Interbranch Accountability in State Government and the
Constitutional Requirement of Judicial Independence, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer
1998, at 21, 25; sources cited supra note 2.
48 See Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President'sPower to Execute
the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 570-99 (1994); Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power Over Foreign Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231, 295-355 (2001);John
Yoo, War, Responsibility, and the Age of Terrorism, 57 STAN. L. REV. 793, 810 (2004).
49 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
50 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 532 (2004) (plurality opinion).
51 Why this state of affairs may be problematic for dominant legislative coalitions
without prompting them to fix it is discussed in Part V.
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a.

Asset Freezing

assisting him have powerful
The President and federal officials
One such tool, involving
tools to regulate foreign economic activities.
Emergency Economic Powers
designations under the International
"block," or freeze access to, any
Act (IEEPA) ,52 lets the President
when two conditions approperty subject to United States jurisdiction,something in which a formust be
ply. First, the property in question
53 This constraint turns out
interest.
eign country or national has an
the President's power, since courts
not to be much of a limitation on
does not have to be a legal inhave found that the "foreign" interest
that an American organization has
terest of any kind. The mere fact
say that it
be enough, in fact, for a court to
foreign beneficiaries may
54
the President must use this power
has a "foreign interest." Second,
55
is not much of a limitation either.
only during an emergency. This
giving rise to the emergency
The "unusual and extraordinary threat"
56
a
the United States. It must pose
must have its source partly outside
the
of
foreign policy, or economy
threat to the "national security,
lan5 7 Given the combined effect of this expansive
United States."
on matters of national securguage and traditional judicial deference
have found it relatively easy to
ity and foreign affairs, Presidents
law (about ten of which are currently
declare emergencies under the
under the terms of IEEPA, that a
in effect).s8 Courts have yet to find,
supposed emergency does not exist.
President has delegated much
In a series of executive orders, the
the Secretaries of State and Treasury.
of his authority under IEEPA to
Treasury's Office of Foreign Asset
Under the resulting system, the
of groups branded "Specially DesigControl (OFAC) blocks the assets
Use of the
See generallyJamesJ. Savage, Executive
52 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (2000).
Taliban
and
Through the Terrorist

Act--Evolution
InternationalEmergency Economic Powers
the hisWinter 2001, at 28, 28-31 (describing
LJ.,
Sanctions, CURRENTS: INT'L TRADE
tory and effect of IEEPA).
53 50 U.S.C. § 1701(a).
(7th Cir. 2002).
v. O'Neill, 315 F.3d 748, 752-53
54 See Global Relief Found., Inc.
55 See 50 U.S.C. § 1701(a).
56 Id.
57 Id.
the
Forcing Constraint: The Case for Amending
58 See generally Jason Luong, Note,
("Con(2000)
1197
1181,
Act, 78 TEx. L. REV.
InternationalEmergency Economic Powers
the presieconomic regulations enacted by
the
to
acquiesced
will,
gress has consistently
political
of
inadequate legislative drafting, lack
dent under the IEEPA because of
common of the IEEPA regulations-economic
and popular support for the most
sanctions and embargoes.").
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59
Once a group becomes a specially
nated Terrorist Organizations.
loses control over its fate. The
designated terrorist organization, it
the organization's funds, reimpact of the OFAC's orders is to block
they happen to be. Each
gardless of where in the financial system
trigger a separate civil fine of up
violation of the blocking orders can
are subject to criminal penalties, into $50,000,60 and willful violators
and fines of up to $50,000
cluding up to twenty years imprisonment
also triggers severe criminal
6
per violation. 1 A similar designation
providing "material support" (inpenalties punishing individuals for
contributions such as lodging) to
cluding funds and in-kind economic
62
designated terrorist organizations.
the government's desigTake a closer look at how a court reviews
Foundationfor Relief and Developnations. In the recent case, Holy Land
63
Treasury departments used their
ment v. Ashcrofl, the State and
to freeze the assets of the Holy
delegated presidential IEEPA powers
review of the blocking order conLand Foundation (HLF).64 Court
capricious" under the terms of
sidered whether it was "arbitrary and
65 But given the national security
the Administrative Procedure Act.
district and appellate courts also
context of the decision, the reviewing
a highly deferential form of
interpreted the relevant law to require
example, emphasized the limited
review. 66 The district court, for
67
question, the district court and the
scope of its role. The key factual
HLF's connection to Hamas, anlitigants agreed, was the extent of
organization (and one that, at least
other specially designated terrorist
to doubt as a "terrorist organizaat this point, few people had reason
a careful examination of the
tion").68 The district court conducted
that
record and uncovered "ample" evidence
to Hamas since its creation
(1) HLF has had financial connections
actively involved in various
in 1989; (2) HLF leaders have been
HILF funds Hamas-controlled
meetings with Hamas leaders; (3)
to the

provides financial support
charitable organizations; (4) HLF
martyrs and prisoners; (5) HLF's
orphans and families of Hamas

59
2003).
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68

Cir.
v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156, 160 (D.C.
Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev.
July 2006).
50 U.S.C.A. § 1705(a) (West Supp.
Id. § 1705.
2003).
18 U.S.C. § 2339 (2000 & Supp. 11I
333 F.3d 156.
Id. at 159-60.
Id. at 162.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 161.
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Jerusalem office acted on behalf of Hamas; and (6) FBI informants
reliably reported that HLF funds Hamas. 69
The D.C. Circuit upheld this determination on appeal. 70 In doing so, the court legitimized a review process that arguably renders
administrable the federal government's web of emergency economic
regulatory powers. That process might also strike some observers as
particularly thorough. But whatever one's views about the former issue, the latter perception is mistaken, for at least two reasons. First,
the court considers only whether the decision was "arbitrary and capricious," and based on "substantial evidence," not whether it was right
or wrong. 71 That determination, moreover, reflects a statutory text
(the APA and IEEPA) and tradition that makes the court's inquiry
extremely deferential and perhaps helps explain why so few of these
determinations get challenged in court (because it's not clear what
will be gained). Second, as a practical matter, the court's inquiry
(even where, as in Holy Land, the district court pushes the envelope in
terms of the stringency of its review) begins and ends with the record
that the government itself compiles. As the district court itself noted
in this case, the arbitrary and capricious standard "does not allow the
courts to undertake their own fact finding, but [instead only allows
the court] to review the agency's record to determine whether the
agency's decision was supported by a rational basis." 72 That record
may be a tremendously accurate compilation of the government's evidence. Or it may be patently misleading. Nothing requires the government to report evidence tending to cast doubt on its
contentions. 73 Nor does the court interview the sources on which the
record is based; thus court review is only as good as the record.
The flip side of this point is that court review will probably exert
only a limited impact on the quality of that record. A court will vacate
the designation if the record in question turns out to be an empty
folder. On the other hand, officials who want to evade that possibility
need only make sure there is a thick enough record to make it hard
for the court to conclude that such a record makes the designation
69 Id. (quoting Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 219 F. Supp. 2d
57, 69 (D.D.C. 2002)).

70

Id. at 161-63.

71 Id. at 163 (applying these standards in reviewing the actions and record at
hand).

72

Id. at 162.

73 Ironically enough, the Holy Land appeals panel suggested that the government's position was strengthened by the fact that "Ithere was no plausible evidence
presented which showed that [ties to Hamas] had been severed." Id.
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look totally arbitrary. Yet the record itself is based on decisions that
74
are essentially immune from review.
b.

Environmental and Occupational Safety Administrative
Compliance Orders

By subjecting individuals to severe practical and reputational consequences, harsh criminal indictments may operate as discretionary
sanctions. But individuals and organizations tend to face formal punishments in the criminal justice system only after they are convicted or
admit their guilt. Statutes creating major regulatory programs reflect
a different premise. Many such laws allow regulators to levy fines or
issue orders restricting certain activities with more limited court intervention. Although they vary in the relevant legal standard or the size
of the maximum fine, those orders can have an effect before judicial
intervention. Even after that intervention, it is not clear how well the
stringency of review provided by courts (which tends to conform to
some variation of the "arbitrary and capricious" or "abuse of discretion" standards) strikes the most desirable balance between restraining abuse and providing regulatory flexibility.
For instance, when the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) or its contractors have some reason to think businesses are violating their general duty to provide a safe working
environment, the agency can issue abatement orders and citations. 75
Although parties may (and often do) contest citations, doing so is expensive, which means some parties just pay the relatively meager fines
OSHA tends to assess instead of contesting them. Penalties for violating compliance orders are considerably more severe under environmental statutes, like the Clean Air Act.76 Under that statute, the

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) can issue an Administrative
Compliance Order (ACO) on the basis of "any available information,"
directing a regulated party-such as an electricity generation plant74 Manipulation of the record, moreover, need not be conscious or explicit. A
number of pressures could affect the considerable number of investigators, analysts,
spies, lawyers, and higher level officials whose work influences the record that the
court reviews. As long as they feel at least some subtle pressure to support the conclusion that a designation should be made, they may fail to consider countervailing arguments, or the potential consequences of an "erroneous" designation (i.e., erroneous
in the sense of not complying with the statute, the President's executive order, the
"arbitrary and capricious" standard, or the executive branch's stated goals for using
the IEEPA emergency powers).

75

See 29 U.S.C. § 666(a)-(c) (2000).

76

42 U.S.C. §§

74

01-

767

1q (2000 & Supp. ItI 2003).
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requirements.
with the Clean Air Act's
or state agency to comply
EPA to impose fines or other penalWhile the ACO does not allow the
imposing civil or criminal
ties directly, the order triggers provisions
78 Under the terms of the Act, it
penalties for violation of the order.
review of an ACO was supposed
initially appeared as though judicial
orparty violated the terms of 7the
9 This
to focus on whether the regulated
place.
to issue it in the first
der, not whether the EPA was right
about how the order itself should
has understandably raised questions
Supreme Court and several circuit
be reviewed. In recent cases, the
about whether the ACO structure
courts have left some uncertainty
given its due process implications.
withstands constitutional scrutiny
not to be final agency actions,
At least one circuit has found ACOs
and raising the due process
thereby rendering them unreviewable
to review this case, and in0
problem.8 The Supreme Court declined
a Ninth Circuit opinion holding
stead-in a separate case-upheld
reviewing them under the "arbiACOs to be final agency actions8 1 and
trary and capricious" standard.
power over when to imBoth agencies therefore retain enormous
obviously has it when it issues citapose compliance orders. OSHA
of which are not challenged
tions and abatement orders, some
capricious" review is not as defersubsequently. Even if "arbitrary and
asset freezes, it still leaves the court
ential in this context as it is with
of review to a decision that can
applying a fairly deferential standard
8 2 It is quite plausible that
be based on "any available information.
in review is a reasonable comprothe extent of resulting stringency
applied across the board, to every
mise if the standard is going to be
possible that such review will not say
compliance order. It is also quite
order decisions, which could
much about the quality of compliance
the extent of confidence in the
(or perhaps should) ultimately affect
more exhaustive review of reguregulatory structures. Put differently,
orders could change the bunlatory decisions to impose compliance
Id. § 7413(a) (5).
discussion, see generally Jason D. Nichols,
78 See id. § 7413(b)-(c). For a detailed
Compliance Orders: Balancing Due Process
Towards Reviving the Efficacy of Administrative Environmental Law, 57 ADm IN. L. REv.
Flexibility in
Concerns and the Need for Enforcement
Air Act).
use of ACOs to enforce the Clean
EPA's
the
(discussing
193, 197-99 (2005)
79 See 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b)(2).
336 F.3d 1236, 1258 (1 th Cir. 2003).
80 See Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Whitman,
v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 496 (2004);
81 See Alaska Dep't of Envtl. Conservation
2002), affd
v. EPA, 298 F.3d 814, 822 (9th Cir.
Alaska Dep't of Envtl. Conservation
540 U.S. 461.
82 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a) (5).
77
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die of substantive powers and penalties that could be acceptable to an
enacting legislative and interest group coalition.
C. How Discretion is Managed Through Variations in the Stringency of
TraditionalJudicial Review
The preceding examples demonstrate how even the availability of
substantive review can conceal vast reservoirs of bureaucratic flexibility. A host of other domains-varying in the availability of formal review but not in the fact that they leave authorities with discretionpose similar problems. Such domains involve, among others, the impact of prosecutors' charging decisions on suspects, the operation of
so-called "no-fly" lists impacting Americans' air travel activities, 83 the
meager judicial scrutiny of discretion vested in government contractors engaged in quasi-official functions, 84 the enormous power federal
officials wield (even in the wake of recent Supreme Court decisions
on the subject) in designating enemy combatants,8 5 and even in the
myriad decisions governing federal procurement predicated on the
exercise of government officials' legal discretion. 86 How, then, should
courts and legislatures respond to perceived inadequacies in the degree of external scrutiny for these decisions?
What courts and legislatures have not done is to move towards
maximally limiting discretion, by subjecting every decision to the type
of stringent review associated with de novo fact-finding. This courts
and legislatures are understandably loath to do in domains where they
perceive relatively broad executive discretion to have benefits, and
where they perceive judicial resources to be scarce. Instead, judges
and lawmakers tend to manage the costs and benefits of discretion by
varying the stringency of review that is supposed to apply to the actions of the executive or her agent. Whether courts are driven to do
this by anodyne judicial prudence or rigid legislative mandates, they
83 See Justin Florence, Note, Making the No Fly List ly: A Due Process Model for Terrorist Watchlists, 115 YALE LJ. 2148, 2157-59 (2006).
84 See generally Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization As Delegation, 103 COLuM. L. REV.
1367, 1400-10 (2003) (arguing that privatization would lessen judicial review); Steven
L. Schooner, ContractorAtrocities at Abu Ghraib: Compromised Accountability in a Streamlined, Outsourced Government, 16 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 549, 562-64 (2005) (discussing
the dangers of contractors who receive no guidance or management).
85 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518-19 (2004) (plurality opinion).
86 SeeJody Freeman, The ContractingState, 28 FLA. Sr. U. L. REv. 155, 165 (2000)
(noting that, despite the "highly technocratic approach to contract design" prevalent
in federal procurement law, the existing framework is "too limited to address the
much more substantial issues that arise" in some contracts).
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review some decisions more stringently, and others less so.8 7 Even decisions putatively subject to the same standard of review, such as the
familiar "arbitrary and capricious" touchstone enshrined in the Administrative Procedure Act, may end up being reviewed with different
degrees of stringency. The distinctions presumably reflect courts'
judgments about when the costs of added scrutiny are justified. 88
Thus, judges and scholars generally take "arbitrary and capricious" review to mean one thing (milder review) for a typical informal adjudication, such as deciding whether a vehicle fits standards permitting
entrance to a national forest, and another (more stringent review)
when courts are reviewing an intricate regulatory rule governing the
licensing of nuclear reactors.8 9
Stringency of review is what. distinguishes these two different versions of the "arbitrary and capricious" standard. Stringency is what
differentiates government decisions that receive greater judicial scrutiny from those that get less. The term is meant to serve as an abbreviated reference to the mixture of doctrines governing such distinctions
in the strictness of review applied to an agency's factual or prescriptive
conclusions in a given decision. The concept includes the standard of
review governing appeals of specific administrative actions. It is affected by the degree of outright deference given to the executive
branch, and the extent to which courts find through constitutional or
statutory interpretation that a particular decision ought to be committed by law to agency discretion. More stringency can imply more rigorous procedures (such as those that might be imposed on due
process groups) that the government must follow before imposing a
cost on someone, a less permissive standard of review for the factual
findings of executive branch agencies (or lower courts), and less overall deference to the government's decision itself. Thus, when a court
87 See cases cited supra note 11.
88 Indeed, casual observers may be forgiven for assuming (heroically) that courts
(or legislatures, when they directly impose limits on review) are balancing the marginal costs and benefits of greater stringency of review. See infra Part I.D.2 for a
discussion.
89 See, e.g., SE(TION OF ADMIN. LAW AND REGULATORY PRACTICE, Am.BAR Ass'N, A
BLACKLETTER STATEMENT OF FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE

LAw 34 (2004). The Blacketter

Statement provides a cogent and revealing synthesis:
The court may set aside an agency action as an abuse of discretion ...
on any of several grounds. In practice, application of these grounds varies
according to the nature and magnitude of the agency action. Thus, a court
will typically apply the criteria rigorously during judicial review of high-stakes
rulemakingproceedings (a practice commonly termed "hard look" review), but much
more leniently when reviewing a routine, uncomplicated action.
Id. (emphasis added).
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determines that a six-page declaration from an official ensconced beneath layers of the Defense Department bureaucracy is enough reason
to detain someone for an indefinite period of time, it is being more
deferential. 90 When a court decides such justification is insufficient,
because the executive must provide a "meaningful opportunity" for
someone so designated to get notice of the factual basis for their detention and to contest their status, it is being less deferential.9 '
Though courts engage in review at different levels of stringency
depending on the statutory context and judgments about the feasibility of more intense scrutiny, their work across contexts tends to follow
a certain convention. When deciding how much of that power to let
executive authorities keep, courts and legislators tend to implicitly assume that a particular degree of stringency in review will apply, once
articulated (and assuming it is actually followed), across the board to
all similarly situated cases. 92 In fact, courts treat horizontal equity as
an important value, where deviations must be defended. 93 The same
goes for virtually all the legislative mandates that courts implement.
The move to privilege horizontal equity in judicial review is the essence of traditional judicial review. 94 Its rationale may be grounded in
an appreciation for stare decisis, or perhaps resides in an inflated conception of judicial power to ensure that like cases are treated similarly.
90 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 473 (4th Cir. 2003), vacated, 542 U.S. 507
(2004).
91 See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 509 (plurality opinion).
92 For some examples from different regulatory contexts, see Bowen v. Mich.
Acad. of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 675 (1986) (discussing legislative reluctance
to tax judicial resources by allowing routine review of Medicare Part B claims); Bush v.
Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 388 (1983) (noting, in the context of reviewing an alleged retaliatory demotion and defamation claim against a federal official, that "[t]he costs associated with the review of disciplinary decisions are already significant-not only in
monetary terms, but also in the time and energy of managerial personnel who must
defend their decisions"); Langevin v. Chenango Court, Inc., 447 F.2d 296, 303 (2d
Cir. 1971) (finding that judicial review of the Federal Housing Agency's discretionary

actions resulting in rent increase approvals in part on the basis that an unacceptably
high number of rent increases would be subject to review). Here and in similar cases,
the court's discussion of costs assumes (either implicitly or explicitly) that whatever
costs are generated by the stringency of review the court adopts in the present case
will be applied to future cases with similar characteristics. See supranote 12 for examples of briefs making this argument.
93 See Cole, supra note 2, at 2567-77.
94 The reference to "traditional judicial review" implies that executive decisions
can be reviewed through judicial fora, where judges tend to believe that court decisions governing how stringent the review of discretionary executive decisions is will
affect every future case (or nearly so) in a particular class, and where litigants seek,
and the court can deliver, some kind of relief, such as vacating a particular government action or providing an injunctive remedy.
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Predictably, the desire for horizontal equity in standards governing
the stringency of review renders troubling (at least in the eyes of many
principled observers) the prospect of increasing the stringency of review in a particular case. A decision to increase review stringency in a
single case is taken to cast a long shadow on all similar decisions in the
relevant pool of cases, and to prohibitively increase the associated
costs in terms of the direct burdens of review and the forgone benefits
of discretion.

D.

95

Why Audits Could Serve as a Valuable Supplement to Traditional
JudicialReview

How might the legal system better manage the costs and benefits
of the high-discretion, low-review-stringency regime associated with actions committed to agency discretion or subject to highly deferential
review? Plainly, the answer depends on how one defines "better," a
point that will be taken up in earnest below. For the moment, imagine that society fears mistakes in the exercise of executive discretion
but also seeks to harness expertise and conserve review resources. Imagine further that society has at its disposal some new amount of resources that can be used either to expand slightly the scope or
stringency of traditional judicial review over highly discretionary activities, or in some other fashion. How else might those resources be
used?
1. The Role of Audits in Overseeing Complex Organizations
One answer can be found in what government organizations repeatedly do to the public: they audit.9 6 As the term is used here, an
audit of executive discretion is a stringent evaluation of a sample of
discrete decisions drawn randomly from a larger pool, using an explicit standard fixed in advance, with the results announced to the
public. 9 7 Its aim is to uncover, for each reviewed case, whether a par95 Cf CASs R. SUNSTEIN, AFrER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION 219 (1990) ("lAin unduly aggressive judicial posture may increase delays and paperwork in a way that
threatens implementation.").
96 Robust ombuds systems, such as those used in Scandinavian countries, may
represent another alternative. Nonetheless, if an ombuds system functioned as it is
traditionally understood in being driven by public complaints, it would have some of
the same strengths and weaknesses that the litigation process would, and would
thereby provide a somewhat distorted picture of bureaucratic activity.
97 Each of these features interacts to give the proposal developed here its unique
characteristics. (1) Random selection assures a representative picture of decisions
and provides a mixed strategy approach to deterrence that is difficult to evade. See
infra Part II.A. (2) Fixing some standard in advance reduces risk-normalization dy-
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ticular discretionary decision is in accord with some defensible standard grounded in public representations of the executive branch,
implicit in statutes or constitutional doctrine, or defined by the auditor in advance.
In contrast to financial or more wide-ranging program management audits, the audits of executive discretion envisioned here treat
each discretionary decision, such as a decision to label a group as a
specially designated terrorist organization, as the unit of analysis.98
Audits of executive discretion would evaluate the information supporting the decision, its origins and reliability, contradictory information, and the broader context in which the decision took place. Even
in instances where the population of cases from which a sample could
be drawn is relatively small, audits have the potential to "increase the
information extracted from [an organization's] own limited historical
experience by treating unique historical incidents as detailed stories
rather than single data points."99 Though existing audits rarely take
precisely the form I suggest here, the basic idea of using audits to
learn what's going on in the world is neither mysterious nor rare.
Audits associated with taxation are among the most common.
They take place in some form in most reliable tax collection systems.' 0 0 Many tax audits are not entirely random, which reduces their
ability to provide a reliable picture of public behavior. The less random the audits are, the less generalizable their results-and the easier
it might be to evade them by avoiding the behaviors that raise the
probability of being audited.10 1 From this perspective, one of the
"purest" tax auditing programs in recent years (in the sense of being
namics described by scholars of bureaucracy, making it more likely that problems will
be detected by audit bureaucracies that are not immune from the organizational and
political problems affecting the agencies they are auditing. See infra note 136 and
accompanying text (discussing Vaughan's work on the "normalization of risk"). (3)
Public announcement (including provisions for protecting classified information) allows audits to play a role in a larger system of accountability defined by representative
politics and public reactions. See infra Part l.D.
98 Hence, the audits of executive discretion discussed here differ from the more
informal program evaluation audits often undertaken by the GAO and Inspectors
General. The incentives of federal audit bureaucracies to perform different types of
audits are discussed infra Part IV.
99 James G. March et at., Learning From Samples of One or Fewer, 2 ORG. Sci. 1, 2

(1991).
100 See generally JOEL SLEMROD

& JON BAKIJA, TAXING OuRSELVEs
2004) (discussing how the IRS performs audits).

180-82 (3d ed.

101 This last point is at the core of the explanation for why a "mixed strategy" is so
valuable in the framework of game theory. See DAVID A. KREPs, A COURSE IN
MICROECONOMIC THEORY 381-83 (1990).
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almost entirely random) was the Internal Revenue Service's Taxpayer
Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP)o102 The following discussion emphasizes the tremendous informational value of such a
program:
The last thorough tax gap study was for the year 1992, based on
the 1988 TCMP. Noncompliance with individual and corporate income taxes was estimated to cost the Treasury about 18 percent of
actual tax liability, which at 2002 levels of revenue would have
amounted to $223 billion. An average tax rate of 22 percent implies
that there is about $1 trillion of unreported income and illegitimate
03
deductions.1

Without TCMP audits, the federal government is unable to figure
out the size of the "tax gap." The program's cancellation has limited
the government's ability to know how much is paid relative to what is
owed, and who is particularly likely to be responsible for that gap. 10 4
Audits also play a role in regulatory enforcement and court proceedings, such as when federal health care regulators and investigators suspect a health care clinic or nursing home of overcharging the
federal government on Medicare payments. The government sends in
investigators. Instead of figuring out the amount the clinic owes by
reviewing each one of its files, investigators occasionally use audits to
calculate the amount. 10 5 Courts reviewing this practice have repeatedly endorsed it, finding neither a conflict with the statute nor one
with due process.' 0 6 "Sample audits" also make an occasional appearance in class actions. When they do, courts confronted with an entire
class of claims benefit from examining a sample of those claims to
07
gauge the merits of the suit.'

Private markets have made audits even more of a fixture. Administrators frequently deploy auditing techniques in the internal monitoring of private sector organizations, where the warning that "your
call may be monitored for quality assurance" has become ubiquitous.
Hierarchical organizations facing market pressures are riven with information problems. Managers may learn something about their subordinates' performance from market responses. But these
102 SLEMROD & BAIjI.A, supra note 100, at 174.
103 Id. at 175.
104 Id. ("[T]he estimates are based on data that is now over fifteen years old. But
these are the best numbers around.").
105 See Chaves County Home Health Serv., Inc. v. Sullivan, 931 F.2d 914, 915 (D.C.
Cir. 1991).
106 Id. at 916.
107 See, e.g., McComber v. Travelers Prop. & Cas., 37 Conn. L. Rptr. 349, 350-51
(Conn. Super. Ct. 2004).
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responses-commonly driven by a host of factors external to the organization-yield an inexact picture of performance, and waiting for
market responses can risk the organization's well-being.° 8 Audits are
a response in a world of scarce resources. The point of such audits is
not immediately to stop abuses or mistakes in discrete cases. It is to
enable greater learning about what happens to the hundreds or
thousands of individuals interacting with a company's workers, and
how those interactions can be improved. Insurance companies sometimes perform a process of "closed file review," where they spend
more money figuring out whether the amount of money paid out for
a particular insurance claim was correctly calculated than they do paying out the claim itself. 10 9 It is not difficult to see why managers
would rather know more about how their employees are performing.
Nor is it surprising that random audits (at least when they happen
with a sufficiently high probability) make it harder for the people or
organizations being overseen to evade detection. I1 0
Organizational leaders value audits for a reason. Audits mitigate
the problem, common to private organizations and public agencies
regulating private behavior, of learning how individuals are actually
functioning in an inherently complex and unpredictable environment. Indeed, if regulators avoided random auditing techniques altogether, they would face at least two problems. Existing knowledge
about where problems lie may prove deficient or outdated. Perhaps
more important, strategic actors can simply evade review by avoiding
domains where enforcement is already occurring. Recognizing the
possibility of strategic action to evade monitoring, the Supreme Court
lauded random enforcement in United States v. Biswell.I' One afternoon, a pawn shop owner who was federally licensed to deal in sporting firearms was surprised to find a Treasury agent arrive to inspect
the premises. 112 In holding that the Treasury agent could do so without a warrant, the majority observed that:
108 Cf ALBERT O, HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LoYALIv 24-25 (1970) (discussing
the risks to organizations of obtaining performance signals by simply waiting for market-driven "exit" responses among customers, employees, or other constituencies).
109 See J. David Cummins & Sharon Tennyson, Controlling Automobile Insurance
Costs,J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 1992, at 95, 110-11. For a more general discussion of
the value of, and incentives for use of, audits in the private sector, see Ross L. Watts &
Jerold L. Zimmerman, Agency Problems, Auditing, and the Theory of the Firm: Some Evidence, 26J.L. & ECON. 613, 626-33 (1983).

110 See KREps, supra note 101, at 763-64.
111 406 U.S. 311 (1972).
112

Id. at 312.
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[I]f inspection is to be effective and serve as a credible deterrent,
unannounced, even frequent, inspections are essential. In this context, the prerequisite of a warrant could easily frustrate inspection;
and if the necessary flexibility as to time, scope, and frequency is to
be preserved, the protections afforded by a warrant would be
negligible.113

Although the Supreme Court was describing the needs of federal
regulatory bureaucracies overseeing the public, it could just as well
have been describing the needs of legislators overseeing the bureaucracy. Not surprisingly, legislators have created several bureaucracies
capable of using auditing techniques to investigate what government
agencies actually do with their discretion. Occasionally, government
agencies audit the performance of their own workers."14 The Government Accountability Office (originally the General Accounting Office) was created early in the twentieth century primarily to help
115
Congress monitor the financial activities of the executive branch.
In 1974, legislators gave the GAO power to review and analyze the
implementation of government programs.1 16 Shortly thereafter, beginning in the middle of the 1970s and continuing over the next ten
years or so, legislators began creating "Inspector General" offices in
the federal government.1 1 7 Like the GAO, the Inspectors General
have the legal power to investigate how federal officials use their
targeted discretion. The existence of these structures indicates the
potentially important role that audits can play in shaping how the federal government uses its targeted discretion. Whether these bureaucracies actually perform such audits is another matter, discussed
below. 8

How might audits be used in contexts where traditional review
treats an executive decision as essentially committed to agency discretion, or subject to exceedingly deferential, low-stringency review? Imagine a world much like our own, where only some decisions are
113

Id. at 316.

114 See Exec. Order No. 12,564, 3 C.F.R. 224 (1987), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 7301
note (2000) (subjecting numerous categories of federal employees to random drug
tests); Editorial, Guilty UntilProven Innocent, N.Y. TmEs,,Jan. 20, 2006, at A16 (describing how the IRS Office of the Taxpayer Advocate audited a random sample of 500 tax
returns where refunds had been frozen and taxpayers complained, and found that
sixty-six percent of taxpayers deserved a full refund and another fourteen percent
deserved a partial refund).
115 See John T. Rourke, The GAO: An Evolving Role, 38 PuB. ADMIN. REV. 453,
453-54 (1978).
116 Id. at 455.
117 See PAUL LIGHT, MONITORING GOVERNMENT 42 (1993).
118 See infra Part 111.
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others are subject to less strinsubject to stringent judicial review, and
political principals (such as
gent review. For fairly obvious reasons,
is using its discretion.
legislators) desire to know how the governmentbudget to review decia limited
But constraints exist in the form of
the executive branch. Earsions, and concerns about over-deterring
review is that courts and
lier I noted that a key feature of judicial
of deference that is supposed to
legislators tend to pick a standard
class. What audits do is to introduce
apply to all cases in a particular
allows for variation in both the stanan alternative means of review that
as well as the number of cases
dard of deference used to review cases
reviewing fewer cases, whoever is
actually reviewed. In exchange for
more evidence from the executive
conducting the audits can demand
access to information-all at a
branch, more justification, and more
if the same standard of deferlower cost than what would be 1incurred
19
ence applied to every decision.
branch decisions would unAn audit of discretionary executive
would define some discrete set of
fold in three steps. First, an auditor
summary exclusions at the bortargeted decisions to analyze (i.e., all
all occupational safety adminder, all enemy combatant designations,
decisions to prosecute or not to
istrative compliance orders, or all
enforcement agencies regarding
prosecute case referrals from law
choose some number or
mail fraud). The auditor would randomly
Second, those decisions would be
percentage of decisions to audit.
a court would review the full poreviewed far more stringently than
(as with border inspection decitential class of decisions. If a court
the auditor would gather all
sions) provides almost no review,
decision took place, what its efavailable information about how the
when he denied entry,
fect was, what the secondary inspector knew
might be relevant to the decision.
and what other agencies know that
under a highly permissive verIf a court reviews IEEPA designations
"substantial evidence" tests,
sion of the "arbitrary and capricious" and
on how an administrathe auditor would instead gather information
on what it purports to say. In dotive record was compiled-not just
standard either drawn in advance
ing so, the auditor would apply a
question, or perhaps even based
from the purposes of the statutes in
about the goals it seeks to
on the executive branch's own assertions

offered
reminiscent of one that Mashaw
The proposal is, therefore, somewhat
exhaustive
his
in the concluding pages of
for social security benefit determinations
See JERRY L. MASHAW, BuREAUCRATICJLSJ
study of the Social Security Administration.

119

TICE

226 (1983).
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accomplish through the 'audited discretionary decision.' 20 Intelligence information, reviewed in camera, could be used in these determinations.1 21 Third, the results of the audit would be made available
to legislators and the public, a development that could (under certain
conditions) help pressure the agency to, make modifications in its
conduct.
Relying on public responses introduces some uncertainty about
an audit's impact. The effect of this institutional mechanism depends
on whether legislators and the public react to the audits. While both
might sometimes ignore those results, the media's reaction to GAO
and Inspector General reports suggests that audits could prove to be
salient. 22 Judicial review would continue in the background at
whatever standard of deference courts and legislatures choose. Judges
might even evaluate executive clamoring for deference by weighing
whether a reliable audit system is in place, and other courts might
approach their cases differently as a result of what the audits revealed.
Although audits would not necessarily provide relief to every aggrieved person or group, they would help legislators, organized interest groups, and the public to learn far more about what government
23
does than is currently known.'
2.

The Risks of Tolerating the Amount of Discretion Associated
with Traditional Judicial Review

Why would such knowledge prove valuable? The first part of the
answer will require us to retrace the most commonly asserted arguments for expansive discretion. By juxtaposing them against the risks
of discretion, we can better identify the problems that arise from tolerating the amount of open-ended bureaucratic flexibility associated
with traditional judicial review.
120 For instance, in the criminal context, the auditor's determination of a standard
would be shaped by statements of prosecutors regarding the purposes of the prosecutions. See infra notes 204-05 and accompanying text.
121 Cf United States v. Isa, 923 F.2d 1300, 1306 (8th Cir. 1991) (using in camera
review of information obtained by federal agents through wiretaps authorized under
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and denying aggrieved party's motion for
suppression); JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILIv 105-14 (1993) (discussing

how fear of leaking is overblown).
122 See infra Part III.A.
123 Depending on the assumptions made about the political system, legislators and
the public might respond to the audits in ways that would provide relief to all or some
of the people aggrieved by problematic applications of targeted executive discretion.
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Arguments for Expansive Discretion and Their Contingent
Nature

Given the allegedly intimate link between accountability and
court review, departures from a baseline of stringent review presumably should be contingent on a satisfactory accounting of the benefits
from such a move. So what are the benefits? A fairly obvious one is
the speed with which a discretionary decision can be made. More review introduces delay in at least two ways: by providing incentives for
executive branch decisionmakers to engage in greater analysis or deliberation before a decision is made (ex ante), and by potentially delaying the point at which a decision can be fully implemented until
review is completed (ex post). Some decisions need to be made
quickly if they are going to matter. Suppose policymakers confront a
possible outbreak of avian flu virus. They may consider imposing a
quarantine. They must decide quickly whether American airports will
receive flights from the affected country. To delay the decision effectively becomes a decision to let the planes land. Even if it is possible
to wait, it may cost a lot to do so. The Treasury can wait to freeze a
suspicious charity's assets, but those assets may soon leave the group's
coffers for some tropical island bank secrecy haven. Letting executive
authorities have discretion lets them not only decide quickly-the
saved time can translate into money, extra safety, and convenience.
The point is not lost on courts reviewing many of the federal government's national security decisions.1 24 Nor is it lost on courts and
scholars writing about other aspects of public law-such as those concerned about the "ossification" of regulatory rules.1 25 On a related
note, less review also saves two kinds of resources: those the court or
other reviewing authority would expend on analyzing a case, and
those that the government would spend defending itself. These costs
are likely to be especially salient because courts, relying on some version of stare decisis or horizontal equity norms, assume they are fashioning a standard that will apply to all (or nearly all) similar cases. 126
The argument for discretion in such cases often exalts exper1 27
tise.
The conventional wisdom is that agencies and the executive
124 See Water Keeper Alliance v. U.S. Dep't of Def., 271 F.3d 21, 30-35 (Ist Cir.
2001).
125 See CORNELIUS KERWIN, RULEMAMNG 174 (3d ed. 2003); see also McGarity, supra
note 35, at 21-23 (discussing the effect of judicial review on agencies' willingness to
use regulatory authority).
126 See supra Part 1.C.
127 See Perez v. FBI, 71 F.3d 513, 514 n.6 (5th Cir. 1995). But see N. Jersey Media
Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 219-20 (3d Cir. 2002).
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branch have greater specialized technical competence than the judges
who might review their decisions. Given its perceived intellectual pedigree, this justification recurs in judicial decisions in a wide range of
domains, regardless of whether the subject is medical evaluation of
disability claims, military planning, or evaluation of chemical data. 12 8
No doubt that expertise is valuable. The more some reviewing authority intervenes, the greater the risk that expert decisions will be undone. More intervention may even dilute the incentives of
decisionmakers to develop and use expertise, or innovate in desirable
ways that may not immediately inspire public confidence. 129 Discretion may also have a role in helping government harmonize competing goals, trading off some desired goals against further delays (for
130
example) in achieving policy objectives considered less compelling.
In the same vein, supporters of executive discretion accept bold
suppositions about executive branch accountability to bolster their
case. Accountability is surely a contestable and often ambiguous concept. But scholarly references to it appear to encompass, at a minimum, the idea that the public should be able to assign responsibility
for government decisions and to force decisionmakers to bear a cost
when those decisions are not acceptable. In an ironic twist, the rhetoric of accountability that so often bolsters arguments for stringent judicial review sometimes serves precisely the opposite goal. The
argument proceeds along the following lines. The less that court (or
other external) intervention encroaches on the executive's domain,
the more that legislators, organized interest groups and the larger
public can focus on rewarding or punishing the executive (or the inferior officer) for her decisions. 13' This position implies not only a
reluctance to see courts throw sand in the gears of some hypothetical
scheme for accountability, but a confidence that an accounting will
indeed be rendered to either superior officers or the public. Thus
courts observe (as did this one in declining to engage in review of
prosecutorial discretion) that "while this discretion is subject to abuse
128 See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1048 (1984); Vt. Yankee Nuclear
Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 545-48 (1978).
129 Cf KEITH KREHBIEL, INFORMATION AND LEGISLATIVE ORGANIZATION 265 (1991)
(arguing that "informational concerns-in the sense of how politicians can be provided with incentives to study public problems and formulate public policy-are at
the heart of legislative organization").
130 See Greenbaum v. EPA, 370 F.3d 527, 533-34 (6th Cir. 2004).
131 See, e.g., Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984)

("While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is
.... "); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 59
(1983) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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or misuse just as is judicial discretion, deviations from [the prosecutor's] duty as an agent of the Executive are to be dealt with by his
superiors."' 12

b.

The Risks Associated with Expansive Discretion

The arguments extolling discretion have a grain of truth. What
they do not address is how much-and how easily-discretion can be
abused, whether the context is social security benefit payments, border screening, enemy combatant designations, or prosecutorial enforcement. Consider, for example, what could be called the "learning
costs" problem. Executive branch bureaucracies and the people who
work in them spend their days (ostensibly) carrying out legal mandates. People who work there do that in part by relying on expertise.
They hone that expertise by learning from their environment, and
correcting their mistakes. But if no external authority monitors the
bureaucracy, then those who work there may be unwilling or unable
to learn much of anything. In fact, several scholars have suggested
that external court review helps bureaucratic institutions learn.I 3 But
that belief is not always fully explained, and court review carries concomitant risks of over-deterring executive branch activity. No doubt
sometimes an inspector's good conscience or an agency's strong internal culture contribute to reasonable decisions about what assets to
freeze or who should be labeled an enemy combatant. Nonetheless, it
is certainly plausible to assume that such desirable circumstances do
not always arise, and that judicial review helps create conditions that
foster learning.
Four separate but interrelated reasons support this claim. First, a
substantial body of research suggests that people learn when they have
reason to do so.' 3 4 Other things being equal, the dilution of review
may deprive individuals in public bureaucracies of reasons to learn (at
least, limits on review may disrupt public officials' incentives to learn
with the same intensity that they would if review were more stringent).
This assumes, quite plausibly, that a review process turning up mistakes can be embarrassing to people, or that people in the agency may
otherwise suffer some costs if they face some kind of review process
132 Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479, 482 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
133 See, e.g., MASHAW & HArsT, supra note 35, at 111-23 (using the example of
NHTSA to show that agencies react to judicial review).
134 See ARTHUR LUPIA & MATHEW MCCUBBINS, THE DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA 101-48
(1998).
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that does not go well.' 35 Second, organizations develop routines that
blind them. As Diane Vaughan wrote in her study of the Challenger
launch decision:
Possibly the most significant lesson from the Challengercase is how
environmental and organizational contingencies create prerational
forces that shape worldview, normalizing signals of potential danger, resulting in mistakes with harmful human consequences. The
explanation of the Challengerlaunch is a story of how people who
worked together developed patterns that blinded them to the consequences of their actions. It is not only about the development of
norms but about the incremental expansion of normative boundaries: how small changes-new behaviors that were slight deviations
from the normal course of events-gradually became the norm,
providing a basis for accepting additional deviance. No rules were
violated; there was no intent to do harm. Yet harm was done.t 36
External review may elucidate things that people inside the organization fail to appreciate. Outsiders may see things not despite,
but precisely because of, the absence of expertise. Which means that
even if discretion plays a vital role in creating the incentives for people
to gather expertise and for other reasons discussed previously, its
abundance may diminish opportunities for learning from mistaken
enemy combatant designations, border inspection decisions, asset
freezing determinations, and health or safety inspections. The most
attractive kinds of organizational learning-where the organization
learns to achieve important goals better and more efficiently-is likely
to be rarely encountered, if in fact it is encountered at all.1 37 Watering down or forgoing judicial review altogether leaves the problem of
how agencies will learn from their mistakes, and indeed, how agencies
will even realize that they have made a mistake. 38
135 This is certainly true in the case of people who work in offices whose broad
performance is reviewed by the Inspectors General or the GAO. See infra Part IIILA.
136 DIANE VAUGHAN, THE CHALLENGER LAuNcH DECISION 409-10 (1996) (emphasis
added).
137 See March et al., supra note 99, at 2-3; Michal Tamuz, Learning Disabilitiesfor
Regulators: The Perils of OrganizationalLearning in the Air TransportationIndustry, 33 ArMIN. & Soc'v 276, 295-99 (2001).
138 See MASHAw & HAREST, supra note 35, at 111-23, for a discussion of how a
regulatory agency (in that case, NHTSA) learned to use alternative policymaking
strategies to avoid the costs associated with judicial review. The example serves to
emphasize two points, both of which are relevant to the present discussion: (1) that
agencies appear to react to judicial review, and (2) that organizational learning is not
necessarily associated with learning to achieve the most valuable organizational goals
better. Learning can be a bad thing; no doubt that organizations making large numbers of discretionary decisions that rarely if ever get reviewed (or, if reviewed, rarely
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Large grants of discretion can have at least two other problematic
consequences. In some cases, executive branch officials may succumb
to the temptation to use their discretion to create an appealing impression among the public. I discuss this problem at greater length
elsewhere, 139 but the basic insight is a simple one. Executive authorities face fewer checks in the domain of discretionary action than in
traditional regulatory or criminal justice realms. Accordingly, discretionary actions can serve as a sort of signal that the public (or political
superiors) can use in forming judgments about the competence of the
executive branch (or an organization within it). As long as the public's impressions of the executive branch's expertise, success, ability,
and resolve are influenced in part by discretionary actions, then those
actions will become tempting levers to create favorable public perceptions. Frozen assets and specially designated terrorist organizations
send the message that the executive branch knows what it is doing. It
may not. This state of affairs may skew citizens' ability to evaluate the
effectiveness of their own government. And the discretionary actions
may themselves have costs, including the creation of perverse incentives for regulated groups, 40° diminished compliance with treaties, or
simply the mistreatment suffered by individual detainees (for example) whose weeks as enemy combatants became months and then
years before ending (at least for some) in freedom. There is, finally,
the specter of more deliberate transgressions. Just as discretion allows
political authorities to engage in subtle, politically motivated self-dealing, it can also lead to some employees engaging in blatant, willful
1 41

malfeasance.

When stalwart defenders of executive discretion come close to acknowledging these realities, their most frequent move is to invoke a
political process that is rarely expressly defined. They are obviously
right to recognize how public organizations exist in a larger political
context. But assuming that such a context will reliably and consistently counterbalance the tendencies I have just described requires accepting heroic assumptions. Even if voters often behaved relatively
rationally as the term is conventionally understood in modern political science, the results of the political game are endogenous to the
get scrutinized carefully) probably learn that they can shift resources, time, attention,
quality control, and strict adherence to legal or aspirational goals away from those
decisions and towards other pursuits. The question is how to encourage the most
desirable kinds of learning.
139 See Mariano-Florentino CuaIlar, The Mismatch Between State Power and State Capacity in TransnationalLaw Enforcement, 22 BERKELEV J. INT'L L. 15, 44-48 (2004).
140
141

See id. at 49-53.
See THE ABu GHRI-B

INVESTIGATIONS

1-20 (Steven Strasser ed., 2004).
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information available. Agency relationships change in response to
what the players come to know, even if-to paraphrase former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld-voters know what they do not
42

know. 1

A more plausible assumption can, be grounded in the extensive
behavioral research tradition in mid-to-late twentieth-century political
science, suggesting that voters often do not know what they do not
know.' 43 One might even question the electorate's distribution of its
scarce cognitive attention, as there is no particularly good reason to
think that voters come to focus on the facets of law or policy that they
should, even if we use their own consistently expressed and stable values as a benchmark. 44 These limitations constrain the electorate's
capacity to provide a bulwark against bureaucratic failure. And they
explain, among other things, why legislators themselves often do just
fine not only if they ignore festering problems of bureaucratic competence, 145 but if they deliberately create them. 146 The point is not that
electoral checks are irrelevant. It's that they are not entirely reliable,
and they are often dependent on some mechanism-like judicial review-to focus public attention and produce information for it.
In effect, bureaucracies should frequently be expected to face
pressures to render poor decisions, unless they are subjected to con142 See Hart Seely, The Poety of D.H. Rumsfeld, SLATE, Apr. 2, 2003, http://www.
slate.com/id/2081042.
143 See, e.g., LupiA & MCCUBRINS, supra note 134, at 17-38 (1998) (emphasizing
citizens' limited knowledge about politics); Richard R. Lau & David P. Redlawsk, Voting Correctly, 91 Am.POL. Sci. REV. 585, 587-93 (1997) (using survey data to construct
a statistical model estimating the proportion of voters that vote "correctly" given their
attitudes and impressions, and finding that one-in-four voters voted incorrectly in the
five American presidential elections between 1972 and 1988).
144 Cf Mariano-Florentino Cuellar, Rethinking Regulatoy Democracy, 57 ADMIN. L.
REv. 411, 412-16 (2005) (finding that comments made by citizens during the notice
and comment phase of a new administrative regulation were less likely to be incorporated into the final regulation than comments made by administrative attorneys because the citizens' comments lacked technical sophistication even though they
offered constructive insights relevant to the agencies' legal mandates).
145 See Kenneth E.Scott & Barry R. Weingast, Banking Reform: Economic Propellants,
Political Impediments, in REFORMING FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND MARKETS IN THE
UNITED STATES 19, 27-36 (George G. Kaufman ed., 1994).
146 See Barry R. Weingast, Caught in the Middle: The President, Congress, and the Political-BureaucraticSystem, in THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH 312, 338 (Joel D. Aberbach & Mark
A. Peterson eds., 2005) ("Bureaucracy is a pejorative term in modern America, and
rightly so.... The political compromises necessitated by the American constitutional
system mean that legislation rarely attacks problems in a straightforward manner, but
typically through political compromise that combines multiple and conflicting goals
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straints that nudge them in more promising directions. Those constraints depend, in turn, on the public availability of information
about bureaucratic performance. Once the executive discretion problem is thus recast, it becomes plain how audits can often generate
such valuable information. Under marginal cost analysis, if the costs
of review only apply to a small fraction of cases, more stringent review
is possible for that random subset of cases. Willful malfeasance will be
harder to conceal, and (more generally) mistakes that would simply
not appear under deferential judicial review may emerge, regardless
of whether they involve compliance orders, passenger prescreening
procedures, or other forms of administrative action. 147 In short,
courts may find justification for avoiding intrusion into some domains
of executive power on the basis of broad separation of powers or related political question rationales . 4 But the consequentialist case for
limiting review of many routine executive branch decisions must contend with two realities that weaken the case for unfettered executive
discretion: (1) the pervasive risks of bureaucratic mistakes or malfeasance, and (2) the fact that review mechanisms such as audits may
provide valuable new information about executive performance without incurring the range of costs that traditional judicial review would.
3.

A Social Welfare-Oriented Case for Auditing Executive
Discretion

The preceding discussion about the risks of expansive discretion
should tend to support the intuition that audits could improve on
what traditional judicial review provides. We now turn to providing
some analytical support for the intuition by considering a social welfare-oriented justification for audits in a politically uncomplicated
147 This assumes, plausibly, that for most domains the gains from greater stringency in review of the limited sample of cases outweighs cursory review of all cases in
a particular class (which is already available, in most cases, with existing deferential
forms ofjudicial review). Even ifjudicial review is entirely precluded, stringent review
of a small sample may prove vastly more informative than dividing a scarce review
budget among an entire pool of potential cases. For instance, a non-linear function
mapping stringency to a given probability of discovering problems may doom deferential review to uncover nothing; meanwhile, a small percentage sample of a larger
population may reveal almost as much as review of the entire population. See infra
Part Il.B for an elaboration of the last point.
148 In any event, some observers suggest the political question doctrine itself is
becoming increasingly irrelevant. For an insightful discussion of the doctrine's evolution, its relative decline, and the extent to which its theoretical bases are compelling,
see Barkow, supra note 2. As Part L.B notes, no similar growth in judicial assertiveness
is discernible in judicial supervision of more routine instances of executive discretion.
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ability to optiworld, where traditional judicial review limits agents'
discretion.
mally police the exercise of executive
apparent if one makes the
The potential value of audits is readily
analyses of marginal costs and beneheroic assumption that elaborate
governing a pool of pofits in fact determine standards of stringency
therefore, that legislators and
tential cases. Assume for a moment,
the costs and benefits of reviewing
courts have appropriately weighed
degree of stringency. They
a certain kind of decision at a particular
orders freezing assets should get
have decided, for example, that
arbitrary and capricious review.
nothing more than highly deferential
of
legislators think of this degree
Even if conscientious courts and
cona balance among competing
stringency as the best way to strike
there is an unfortunate byproduct
cerns, they may still recognize that
Specifically, some types of errors
of this choice of stringency level.
only be detected if review is more
associated with these decisions can
people engage in deliberate wrongs,
stringent than at present. When
In
efforts to hide their misconduct.
for example, they tend to make
of review to probability of de'
effect, the function mapping stringency
can be radically discontinuous, in
tecting mistakes or manipulation
the costs of review by reviewing
which case it may be better to manage
precisely the trade-off social scienfewer cases more thoroughly. It is
to allocate scarce resources to
tists make when they consider whether
investigate their cases more progetting a larger sample or to
occasionally make when they
foundly, 149 and that courts themselves
reimbursein a class, or health care
. 150
cautiously use samples of claims
process
litigation
in the
ment requests to learn more
more explicitly by focusThe argument for audits can be framed
for reviewing executive discreing on whether new resources available
review or to conduct audits of
tion should be used to expand judicial
review (from courts or othexecutive discretion. Recall that external
of resource constraints. Those conerwise) is subject to various types
51
of review,1 the resources consumed
straints arise from the direct cost
152 and the risks of
to review,
by the executive branch in responding
the potential
accompanying text (emphasizing
149 See infra notes 190-91 and
informamore
generate
to
of using scarce resources
value, in social research design,
than increasing sample size).
tion about individual cases rather
of sample
notes 105-07 (discussing instances
150 See supra text accompanying
adjudication).
of review).
151

cases discussing the costs
See supra note 92 (referencing

the
federal government arguments discussing
of
152 See supra note 12 (referencing
course
the
during
executive branch resources
dangers associated with consuming
the review process).
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over-deterring desirable executive branch activity. 5- Given the scarcity of resources for review, imagine for simplicity that courts and legislators have used marginal cost analysis to optimally balance review
stringency for all (actual or potential) cases arising in a particular class
expected to arise at any point during a given time period. 5 4 And
imagine further that additional resources (in the amount of R) become available to defray all of the aforementioned costs of review.
How should they be deployed?
While no such question can be answered in a vacuum, some useful insights emerge if we make some additional (stylized but plausible)
assumptions. First, audits-as the term is used here-involve random
selection of relevant discretionary decisions for review from a total
pool of decisions made in a given time period.1 55 Moreover, the expected costs of review of all eligible cases under traditional judicial
review in a given time period are higher than for audits. In marginal
cost and benefit terms, as Figure 1 shows, with audits the costs of review rise more slowly as stringency rises because they apply to only a
fraction of the total pool of (actual or potential) cases litigated. This
property of audits allows the optimal degree of stringency to be
higher for cases audited than for cases subject to traditional judicial
review.

153 Cf PETER H. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT 59-81 (1983) (analyzing the overdeterrence problem in the context of damage actions against the government).
154 Court opinions often include references to the efficiency of the particular degree of stringency they have chosen (or the legislature has) for a given class of cases.
See supra note 92. But courts may fail at conducting the analysis. They may be concerned about workload pressures to a degree that overwhelms more nuanced evaluation of marginal costs and benefits. Cf Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart Schwab, The
Reality of ConstitutionalTort Litigation, 72 CORN.ELL L. REv. 641, 693-95 (1987) (discussing the disjuncture between judicial workload concerns and the actual extent of litigation involving constitutional torts). They may fail to analyze the full range of benefits
and costs associated with more (or less) stringent review. Cf Cass R. Sunstein &
Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MIcH. L. REV. 885, 890 (2003)
(arguing that theories of interpretation that ignore institutional capacities and the
dynamic effects of any particular approach to interpretation are inadequate). In any
case, the argument for audits developed above is strengthened when it turns out that
courts and legislatures fail at balancing marginal costs and benefits when fixing the
level of stringency for a particular class of cases.
155 For a discussion of sample size, see infra Part II.B.
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OPTIMAL STRINGENCY UNDER AUDITS AND
TRADITIONAL REVIEW
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Second, for any individual case reviewed, the probability of discovering problems increases as a function of stringency of review.
That is, the harder a reviewer looks, the greater the chance she will
discover a problem with a discretionary decision if there is one.- 6 But
there is an additional complexity, arising from variations in the shape
of the function representing the relationship between review stringency and problem detection. The importance of this function
should be reflected in any principled analysis of the marginal benefits
of review. As Figure 2 indicates, the stringency-problem detection
function may be linear, logarithmic, or sigmoid. Variations presumably depend on context: willful malfeasance should tend to be associated with a sigmoid (s-shaped) function, because of perpetrators'
efforts to cover their tracks, thereby making it possible to discover
problems only after considerable stringency is used to review a decision. For decisions having a sigmoid stringency-problem detection
probability curve, the probability of discovering problems under
highly deferential review may be essentially zero-a condition that is
likely to change only with relatively large increases in review
stringency.
156 For a discussion of what standard a reviewer would apply in an environment
where discretion is often defined precisely by the absence of standards, see infra Part
IC.
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Third, there is a distinctive social benefit (call it an "adjudicatory"
benefit) associated with the use of resources for traditional judicial
review (as opposed to audits) because of the special role that process
plays in resolving individual disputes in addition to generating information. 5 7 The benefit varies depending on whether the new review
resources are likely to correct instances where litigants have suffered
without justification as a result of an executive branch discretionary
decision.
FiGURE 2.

DIFFERENT STRINGENCY- PROBLEM DETECTION CURVES

Linear

Logarithmic

Sigmoid

Problem
Detection
Probability
Axis
Stringency of Review

Fourth, we assume there is relative social consensus regarding the
broad goals associated with lodging discretion for the type of decision
in question within the executive bureaucracy. Difficulties arise because achieving those goals requires both the detection of errors by
bureaucracies and flexibility allowing executive branch officials to apply expertise in specific circumstances. Nonetheless, the extent of
consensus regarding overall goals in this context is reflected in a stable majoritarian coalition of legislators and relevant executive branch
officials (though neither the goals in question nor particular interpretations of what states of the world achieve those goals are necessarily
shared by everyone). We relax this assumption below.
Because we have assumed only R new resources, the specific question is when it makes sense to allocate these resources to audits rather
than traditional judicial review, and assume for simplicity that this is
an all or nothing, binary choice (though nothing critical turns on
this). In an ideal world, that choice ought to depend on several factors that are important to optimize limited review resources. One crit157 This property also generates its own costs, and litigants may face a variety of
standing, redressability, and remedy-related hurdles if they choose to litigate their
cases. But for simplicity, these details need not be addressed here,
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ical factor is the type of stringency-problem detection curve most
common in a particular context, and where the status quo fits in relation to that curve. Suppose again we are dealing with a sigmoid curve.
As Figure 3 shows, if the optimal stringency of review under traditional judicial review before the new resources are added is associated
with a low point on the problem-detection axis, then the new resources are likely to do very little for traditional judicial review. The
available resources must be divided across all cases in a particular
class, making it unlikely that the problem-detection probability will
rise much. Other critical factors include the value of additional information generated from reviewing all cases instead of a sample of
them, and the "adjudicatory" benefit that might arise if resources
spent on adjudication materially change the probability that litigants
will be able to address problems associated with discretionary decisions that have aggrieved them.
In a world with the aforementioned characteristics, the case for
spending the resources on traditional judicial review instead of audits
turns out to be a difficult one. As is almost certainly the case in the
real world, we have assumed that stringency-problem detection curves
vary depending on the context. Only rarely will they be of the precise
shape necessary to render pivotal the small (if not tiny) increase in
review stringency at the margin that is possible when dividing R by the
total number of cases eligible for review under traditional judicial review (N). In contrast, audits can generate valuable increases in problem detection probabilities by allocating R among a smaller pool of
sampled cases (n* in Figure 3). Perhaps something valuable is gained
from reviewing the full population of cases instead of a sample?
Counterintuitively, sampling theory suggests that-from an information-generation perspective-the marginal increase in the accuracy of
information available by reviewing more cases declines dramatically
after a minimum number of cases (several hundred, for example) are
selected for review at random, and this decline occurs even when the
total number of cases in a population is vast.158 Moreover, unless R is
relatively large compared to the previously available resources for review, the value of using the new resources for traditional review from a
158 See infra Part II.B for details. Sampling theory provides one important rationale for randomization--as opposed to an intuitive but potentially misleading focus
on "problem" cases. Although audits can be adapted to focus on reviewing a subset of
decisions that seem from surface indicators to be especially likely to be problematic,
such an approach dilutes what can be learned about the entire pool of cases. To the
extent the relevant bureaucracies and associated organizational leaders know the basis for selection, it also makes it easier to evade review. See supra note 101 and accompanying text (discussing mixed strategies).
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fare context, for example, this pattern can gradually distort public
perceptions of a policy's strengths and weaknesses by focusing attention on only one aspect of an administrative system's problems (e.g.,
underpayments, rather than overpayments).i16 In contrast, audits
have the potential to generate information regardless of the willingness or opportunity of individuals to challenge specific decisions.
Although the preceding account abstracts in limited ways from
the real world, it helps demonstrate why audits would be valuable even
in a world already providing some review of discretion. In most cases
where such review is absent or otherwise undermined, the value of
audits would be even greater. The prescriptive case for audits potentially holds in more complex specifications, such as where political
goals are controversial or resources are redistributed from traditional
judicial review and plowed into audits. But the case is especially compelling in the present analysis, because the question involves how to
use new resources, and there is a broad social consensus about what
executive bureaucracies should accomplish.
Evidently, audits introduce their own costs into the equation.
While fixing the precise cost of an audit system depends on the institutional design issues taken up in Part II, there is good reason to expect that those costs would be lower than those associated with an
expansion in the availability or stringency of traditional judicial review. If the costs of audits are "scalable," such that we can audit a
smaller proportion of cases if the costs are perceived as being too
high, then the proportion of cases that are audited could be reduced.
Presumably, the costs associated with audits, compared to extending
high-stringency judicial review to all cases in a particular class, would
be less-even if we kept the potential remedy-than reviewing all potential cases. Recall: audits would not necessarily yield a direct remedy. 6 2 To the extent that analyses of the marginal costs and benefits
of review incorporate the possible costs to the executive branch of
discussion of how different institutional rules can shape selection effects, see Peter H.
Huang, Lawsuit Abandonment Options in Possibly Frivolous Litigation Games, 23 REv, LiTIc.. 47, 78-85 (2004).

161 See William H. Simon, Rights and Redistribution in the Welfare System, 38 S-r'N. L.
REv. 1431, 1467-68 (1986).
162 If determined advocates of executive branch discretion choose to treat the potential loss of public trust arising from audits as the most important cost to be borne,
then the very fact that audits might be effective in changing public perceptions about
executive discretion might allegedly still make them too costly. This argument may
not always be entirely disingenuous, but it is a harder one to defend than one rooted
in a host of costs involving bureaucratic attention, resources, frivolous claims, and
similarly tangible costs. In any case, the specificity gained in discussing costs may be
at least a partial reward from contemplating audits.
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having a decision vacated by a court, audits would also involve lower
costs because they can be designed merely to reveal information
rather than to provide direct relief.' 6 3
Although the preceding features are likely to render audits quite
valuable, two caveats are in order at this point. First, the argument
thus far tenders audits as a conceptual alternative to judicial review,
not as a wholesale replacement of it. Its principal contention is that
we should consider the implications of policing discretion through
audits instead of through judicial review, which I have characterized as
a form of supervision premised on applying the same degree of stringency to every case in a given class. This does not imply that audits
should generally replace traditional judicial review as an exclusive
means of overseeing executive discretion. Judicial review obviously
serves a host of important functions, of which producing information
about the performance and reasonableness of public bureaucracies
making discretionary decisions is only one. Litigation harnesses the
intricate machinery of adjudicatory bureaucracy to articulate and clarify legal norms in the context of specific cases. It can vindicate the
interests of people who are legally and morally entitled to a proverbial
"day" in court, or to a set of special remedies for which litigation is the
164
best rationing device.
Second, the belief that audits can deliver the aforementioned
benefits depends on making certain assumptions about the powers of
the auditor, though all are plausible. The auditor must be in a better
position to discover problems in the use of targeted discretion than
the bureaucracy being reviewed. In this context, the reference to
"better position" implies at least three qualities: (1) that the auditor is
163 For a brief discussion of whether the GAO and Inspectors General should allocate a material share of their existing resources to audits of executive discretion, see
infra Part III.A.
164 There may be some instances where actual or perceived resource constraints

force a choice between policing discretion through audits or doing so through some
expanded version of judicial review (i.e., supplementing narrow review of constitutional questions with a broader arbitrariness review). In those exceptional circumstances, the framework I have provided suggests that sometimes-such as when it is
likely that officials have made an effort to conceal willful malfeasance-allocating
scarce resources to audits would be preferable to allocating them to traditional judicial review. Nonetheless, my primary goal is therefore to argue that supplementing
such review with audits would make possible the production of socially valuable information. Such information simply would not be available where reviewing authorities
are constrained to review every case in a particular class with the same degree of
stringency. Once that information is available, judges could be among the consumers
of it by adjusting their evaluations of the appropriate degree of judicial scrutiny that a

given class of decisions warrants.
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motivated to discover problems (and not to exaggerate them), thereby
avoiding some of the willful malfeasance and politically oriented selfdealing problems that bureaucracies have because of their political
context; (2) that the auditor has sufficient abilities to evaluate the discretionary decision, perhaps in part through reference to some explicit or implicit standard of what is expected from such decisions;
and (3) that the auditor is at least somewhat better than the decisionmakers being reviewed at avoiding some of the more subtle mistakes that afflict discretionary decisionmaking. Tempting as it may be
to collapse these conditions into an "expertise" parameter, it is important to recognize that expertise (in addition to being a far more ambiguous term than is often recognized) is a dangerously seductive yet
potentially quite dangerous two-edged sword: what makes some bureaucratic decisionmakers blind to the complexities of the problems
they face is precisely their expertise in defining those problems in a
1 65
standard, predictable fashion that often turns out to be wrong.
Nonetheless, the auditor(s) must know something about what constitutes accuracy when allegedly terrorist assets are frozen or when agencies use administrative compliance orders.16 6 Whether it is possible to
generate this and other conditions depends in large measure on how
to resolve questions about the details of the institutional design addressed below.
4.

How Audits Would Fare in a Politically Fragmented World

Most of the time, the world in which bureaucracies exercise discretion-and therefore the world in which auditors would operate-is
more complicated than the analysis above suggests. Politicians differ
over what they want the bureaucracy to accomplish. 16 7 Even when leg165 See, e.g., VAUGHAN, supra note 136, at 63 ("[T]he consequence of professional
training and experience is itself a particularistic world-view comprising certain assumptions, expectations, and experiences that become integrated with the person's
sense of the world."); see also CHARLES PERROW, NORMAL ACCIDENTS (1984) ("A warning ... is only effective if it fits into our mental model of what is going on. As with the

'warnings' of Pearl Harbor, it can get swamped by the multitude of signals that fit our
expectations, and thus be discounted as 'noise' in the system."); SCOTT D. SAGAN, THE
LIMITS OF SAFETY (1995) (noting that adding redundant safety devices does not always
increase safety because human operators can often work around these redundancies
if the devices do not serve immediate interests).
166 And obviously, whatever the benefits of specialization, they need to be balanced against the risks.
167 See generally Terry M. Moe, The New Economics of Organization,28 Am. J. POL. SCI.
739 (1984) (arguing that theories of hierarchy developed in the field of organizational economics can contribute much to the understanding of political control over
bureaucracies).
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islative majorities support the creation of the bureaucracy or the delegation of legal powers to it, some coalition members may actively work
to restrain the agency's powers. Others will encourage the agency to
make the broadest reading of its mandate. 6 In what follows, I relax
the assumption of broad political consensus about what constitutes
desirable bureaucratic performance. The analysis reveals: (1) that auditors would likely have a much harder time in such a world, but (2)
that participants in the political process could still be persuaded to
support audits in narrow circumstances. Put simply, the analysis here
shows how generating sufficient political interest for audits to survive
is possible even in a politically complicated world of heterogeneous
political preferences and divided politicians. The range of dynamics
making this result unlikely (though far from impossible) is explored
in Parts III and IV. For now the point is that political realities make
the fate of audits contingent, rather than dooming them entirely.
To see this, imagine a somewhat different situation than the one
posited in the previous subsection. First, lawmakers and executive
branch officials in a governing coalition have political preferences regarding what they want the bureaucracy to do with its legal authority
(approve drugs faster or more slowly, impose fewer or more environmental administrative compliance orders, make it easier or more difficult for an alien to demonstrate sufficient credible fear to merit
formal asylum procedures, and so on). 1 69 And those preferences differ more often than not. Second, politicians in a governing coalition
may nonetheless also have a set of more widely shared concerns about
bureaucratic performance1 7 Regardless of their preferences about
the existence of nuclear weapons, for example, lawmakers and executive branch officials are likely to be alarmed by material lapses in the
168 See Weingast, supra note 146, at 318-31.
169 For examples of work analyzing the implications of divergent preferences on
specific issues among members of broad governing coalitions, see David P. Baron, A
Noncooperative Theory of Legislative Coalitions, 33 Am. J. POL. SCI. 1048 (1989); Michael
Laver & Kenneth A. Shepsle, Government Coalitions and Intraparty Politics, 20 BRIT. J.
POL. Sci. 489 (1990). For an analysis of when coalition governments have especially
pronounced incentives to monitor the bureaucratic implementation of policies at the
ministerial level, see Micahel F. Thies, Keeping Tabs on Partners: The Logic of Delegation
in Coalition Governments, 45 AM. J. PoL. Sci. 580 (2001).
170 See Bruce Bimber, Information as a Factorin CongressionalPolitics,16 LECIS. STUD.
Q. 585, 596 (1991). Indeed, although the incidence of legislative proposals drawing
unanimous or near-unanimous support varies, such proposals are not rare. For a discussion of empirical evidence demonstrating the recurring importance of universal or
near-universal legislative coalitions, see Melissa P. Collie, The Legislature and Distributive Policy Making in Formal Perspective, 13 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 427, 445-49 (1988).
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safety of a nuclear stockpile. 1 7' Concern about bureaucratic malfeasance may also straddle ideological divisions even when the potential
for catastrophe falls far short of accidental nuclear detonation; both
opponents and proponents of particular surveillance programs, for instance, may share concerns about the program's potential mismanagement even when their underlying reasons for concern are different. 7 2
Third, audits consume resources. As the analysis above noted, these
resources may be used for alternative purposes. The political merits
of those alternative uses weigh on decisionmakers. Fourth, politicians
may have greater or lesser uncertainty about bureaucratic perform178
ance depending on the context.
When politicians consider the merits of developing an auditing
system in such a world, the complications come from more than just
the direct cost of that system. While audits may limit near-universally
derided problems (such as, for example, federal agents' use of surveillance authority under the Patriot Act to pursue personal vendettas),
they can also stop agencies from achieving goals that some politicians
would rather see them achieve. 74 Politicians consider this trade-off in
the context of four critical factors that follow from the assumptions
above: (1) the cost of audits relative to other desirable functions, (2)
the perceived risk of broadly derided problems, (3) the extent of uncertainty about bureaucratic performance with respect to such
problems, and (4) the potential impact of audits on agency activities
that inspire differing degrees of political support. It is manifestly possible, as lawmakers and executive branch officials weigh these considerations, for them to conclude that audits' potential to reduce
uncertainty and prevent near-universally derided bureaucratic activity
outweigh their costs or their unfavorable political effects. 75
171

For an illuminating account of how common such lapses are, see SAGAN, supra

note 165, at 251.
172 See supra Part I.D.2 for a discussion of the risks of bureaucratic malfeasance
and related shortcomings.
173 SeeJonathan Bendor & Terry M. Moe, An Adaptive Model of BureaucraticPolitics,
79 Am. POL. Sci. REV. 755, 761 (1985) (discussing variations in the extent of politicians' knowledge of bureaucratic performance).
174 Audits' chilling effect on agency activities found desirable by a subset of the
political coalition would arise as a result of the information they might reveal to pivotal legislators or organized interests, who could in turn shape the perceptions of
mass political audiences.
175 Cf William Bernhard, A PoliticalExplanation of Variations in Central Bank Independence, 92 AM. POL. Sci. Riv. 311, 312-15 (1998) (discussing how legislators may
create an independent central bank as a commitment device not only in spite of, but
because of, politicians' differing incentives on monetary policy); Matthew Potoski,

Managing Uncertainty Through BureaucraticDesign: Administrative Procedures and State Air
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Such calculations would be shaped by beliefs about the prospects
for political control of the bureaucracy, which can raise or lower the
value of keeping bureaucratic discretion as unfettered as possible
from their perspective.1 76 In addition, as noted in Part IV, politicians
who might support audits if voting sincerely may still have strategic
reasons to oppose audits in the hopes of provoking more pronounced
institutional change. But the possibility remains that audits initially
can survive political evisceration, and the intuition in support of that
possibility is a simple one: even in the presence of ideological differences, raw errors can matter enough to engender support for audits
among politicians and executive branch officials with sharply different
policy goals.' 77 And once audits begin to occur, the auditors themselves may endeavor to build a political constituency for them. 7 8
The strategic dynamic occasionally making audits politically viable can be analogized to committee deference in legislatures, where
majoritarian chamber coalitions defer to legislative committees to encourage the development of specialization. The problem legislators
face in that context is uncertainty about the precise effect of the complex laws they enact, such as immigration and refugee law provisions,
complex tax depreciation changes, new rules governing the transfer
of defense-related technologies to other countries, and changes to the
drug approval process. An important strand of scholarship on the organization of the Congress persuasively argues that politicians can better achieve their goals by reducing the extent of that uncertainty, even
when lawmakers have competing or opposite distributional interPollution Control Agencies, 9 J. PuB. ADMIN. REs. & THEORY 623, 626 (1999) (discussing
the information-generating benefits of specific procedural mechanisms and institutional designs for state legislators with differing political goals); Douglas H.
Shumavon, Policy Impact of the 1974 CongressionalBudget Act, 41 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 339,

346-47 (1981) (discussing legislators' incentive for the creation of the Congressional
Budget Office on the basis of the value of unbiased information to politicians with
differing political goals).
176 See Rui J.P. de Figueiredo, Jr., Electoral Competition, PoliticalUncertainty, and Policy Insulation, 96 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 321, 362-28 (2002) (demonstrating the extent to
which, from legislators' perspective, the desirability of mechanisms to constrain the
executive branch depends on beliefs about future control of the executive branch).
177 The existence of an audit program-run by an external private-sector company-associated with the Treasury Department's anti-terrorism wire-transfer screening program involving the SWIFT system may serve as an example. See Greg Miller &
Josh Meyer, Officials Defend Bank Data Tracking, L.A. TIMES, June 24, 2006, at Al.
Some politicians opposed to the program would still prefer that, if the program is to
operate, audits be included in its institutional design. See, e.g., id. But see infra Part
IV.A for a discussion of why some opponents of the wire-transfer screening program
might have strategic reasons to oppose audits.
178 See infra Part N.C.
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ests. 179 On the other hand, reducing uncertainty is costly and requires specialization. Politicians solve the problem by organizing the
legislature to encourage specialization, thereby reducing uncertainty
over time and enlarging the scope of benefits legislators can distribute. As with the opportunity cost associated with specialization,
the creation of and deference to an audit system introduces a layer of
costs. Some costs-such as allocating the resources for the system to
operate-are generic, borne across the legislature itself. Others, such
as the potential impact of audits on the ability of bureaucracies to
make discretionary decisions stretching their legal mandate and pleasing to only a fraction of a governing political coalition, are borne by
specific members (and in this case, those preferring such potentially
distorted implementation). But given the limitations of traditional judicial review and other monitoring strategies, not having audits probably increases legislators' uncertainty about the consequences of their
policy choices, raising the same concerns for legislators that the absence of specialization would.
There is, in effect, a limited political window for audits that opens
when political fears of bureaucratic mistakes and malfeasance combine with politicians' uncertainty about bureaucratic performance. A
politically-oriented justification for audits is possible even in a complicated world of politicians with competing agendas, where those agendas may include a desire among some legislators and executive branch
officials to see bureaucracies fail in achieving their stated goals. Since
neither political apathy nor political sabotage are guaranteed to doom
randomized audits, we may turn our attention to the intricacies of audits' potential institutional design.
II.

WHY THE INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN PROBLEMS INHERENT IN AUDITS

ARE MANAGEABLE
While a framework for conducting audits is adaptable almost by
definition, the design of that framework depends on the answers to
practical questions. Four questions, in particular, prove central to implementing audits. Rather than seeking to resolve all the intricacies
of an audit system, the discussion that follows instead shows how to
address the four critical institutional design questions and how the
issues raised by those questions can be dealt with in practice.
179 See KREHBIL, supra note 129, at 264-65; see also Thomas W. Gilligan & Keith
Krehbiel, Organization of Informative Committees by a Rational Legislature, 34 Am. J. POL.
Sci. 531, 546 (1990) (noting that committees are superfluous if they possess no expertise with which to reduce uncertainty regarding the effects of legislation that they
sponsor).
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A. What Executive Decisions Should be Audited?
The most immediate such question concerns what discretionary
decisions should be prioritized for auditing in a world of scarce resources. As Kenneth C. Davis recognized a generation ago, government authorities are flush with power to make highly informal
decisions affecting people, where "the usual quality of justice" may be
quite low.'8 0 But which decisions should be prioritized for audits? It
is plainly obtuse to seek audits of the most trivial discretionary actions
and informal adjudications, or for similarly trifling executive decisions
outside the context of federal administrative law.""' Certain routine
discretionary decisions, showcased in the preceding discussion, tend
to involve the application of legal authority or general policy justifications to specific facts; their primary effect is on specific individuals
and groups. 182 This type of discretionary power is what allows executive branch officials to freeze allegedly terrorist assets, place someone
on a government-run "no-fly" list, or levy certain environmental or occupational safety fines. This could be called "targeted discretion."
Similar decisions involve bureaucracies applying some implicit or explicit legal standard, often in combination with some sort of policy
basis (e.g., "enemy combatants are dangerous terrorists, many of them
linked to A1-Qaeda") that the executive branch itself has articulated as
a rationale for these decisions.'8 3 Because of their frequency and
their impact on discrete individuals and groups, these "application to
the fact" types of routine discretionary decisions may be most immediately suitable for audits.
180

DAVIS, supra note 2, at 216.

181 Cf Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Taming the Tail That Wags the Dog: Ex Post and Ex
Ante Constraintson Informal Adjudication, 56 ADMIN. L. REv. 1057, 1069 (2004) ("Taken
to its logical extreme, a decision to turn on the lights or lower an agency's office
building temperature two degrees constitutes 'informal adjudication."').
182 Routine executive discretion involving the targeted application of standards to
individuals or groups bears some resemblance to the concept of "informal adjudication" long discussed by administrative law scholars. For a brief discussion of the definitions associated with "informal adjudication" and some of the doctrinal problems
implicit in this category of administrative action, see id. at 1069-75. Obtaining review
of such decisions under the arbitrary and capricious standard, or on the basis of some
constitutional theory, is unlikely to provide adequate oversight for these decisions
because of the specter of the review costs problem. But one should nonetheless beware of the term "informal adjudication" as a description of the full scope of discretionary decisions that merit new review mechanisms. Many discretionary decisions
are neither informal in the sense that they are bereft of some alleged procedural
safeguards (for example, review of administrative compliance orders), and in the case
of many others, the term "adjudication" is but a euphemistic concession to an almost
entirely unrealized aspiration.
183 See Brief for the Respondents, supra note 12, at 11-12.
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Of course, not all instances of routine discretion have the preceding characteristics. Within the category of routine discretion outside
the realm of what would be protected by the political question doctrine, some observers might legitimately distinguish decisions involving broad policy judgments. Certain discretionary judgments, for
instance, involve questions of how to interpret a statute or the relevant
policy considerations when developing a legal standard, such as a regulatory rule or the content of an executive order. Although the principle associated with audits (trading off breadth in exchange for
greater depth) could also be usefully applied to instances of broad
policy judgments, broadly applicable policy judgments may call for a
different form of supplemental review compared to the routine discretionary decisions that involve applying rules or standards to a particu1 84
lar set of facts.
No doubt sometimes executive branch officials will argue that the
distinction between broad policy judgments and routine applications
of authority to individuals and groups is illusory, because some policy
judgments are designed precisely to be carried out through the exercise of targeted discretionary decisions. The Social Security Administration promulgates standards governing benefit payments, thereby
making a policy judgment about how to use its targeted discretion.
When government freezes alleged terrorist assets, the State and Treasury Departments implement statutory standards from the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), 18 5 as interpreted
through policy judgments in the President's executive orders. They
may further contend that the details of a policy judgment-like precisely what behaviors make a charity liable to have its assets frozen-

184 Moreover, such judgments are more likely to garner media and legislative attention even in the absence of audits. And existing investigations performed by audit
bureaucracies and congressional committees are more likely to analyze broad policy
judgments rather than routine instances of executive discretion applying standards to
individuals or groups. See infra Part III. Hence, when resource constraints force a
choice between using audits to screen instances of routine discretion involving applications of law to the facts and broader policy judgments, the former probably merits
greater attention. More generally, the arguments for deferring to the executive
branch when an agency writes a rule or a president signs an executive order seem
weaker when the executive branch claims to be applying a given standard to the facts.
In the latter case the implicit claim is: "we may have to apply some judgment, but
when we detain someone as an enemy combatant, freeze assets, or inspect an industrial plant, there's no question about the purpose we are serving. We're enforcing the
law."
185 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (2000).
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should not be made entirely public, 186 or that standards reflecting
policy judgments-should develop organically in response to experience instead of being fixed ahead of time, or that any review system at
187
all would wreak havoc.
Even if one finds these positions attractive on the surface, it remains useful to draw some distinction between the following classes of
decisions: decisions that explicitly disavow consistency with any standard, decisions that fix a standard that is supposed to apply across
cases, and decisions that apply standards (or even quite general values) to specific cases. To the extent that executive authorities claim to
be applying discretion in accordance with a particular policy rationale
or standard (even one that is not derived directly from a statute), arguments against review become exceedingly difficult to accept. Audits
would generate information about whether the publicly asserted standard was reflected in the discretionary decisions. Though some may
insist that certain discretionary decisions involving national security
(for example) are entirely immune from any standard, 188 in most
cases such a claim seems hard to reconcile with a simple but persistent
imperative: that government decisions should not be arbitrary. Indeed, audits of executive discretion may prove viable even when the
decisions in question superficially appear less amenable to sampling.
It may be possible to modify audits to shed light on applications of
discretion drawn from a sparse set of decisions, or on policy discretion
exercised in the course of rulemaking, by aggregating cases from different domains into a larger population from which to sample. 18 9
186 See Doherty v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 775 F.2d 49, 52 (2d Cir. 1985). For a
skeptical view of such contentions, see VAUGnAN, supra note 136, at 389-90.
187 Cf Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803) (explaining that
although the Court could not review decisions of the executive branch that involved
political discretion, it could enforce the rights of individuals who had been harmed by
executive actions that did not involve political discretion).
188 The contention may be that, in addition to being free of any sort of formal
review, certain national security decisions-like a presidential choice to bomb a potentially threatening target in the Sudan-should not conform to any standard at all.
This position seems to confound the question of whether we should avoid setting a
standard because it is too difficult to monitor, or whether in an ideal world the president should never rely on a standard at all. The former is easier to justify than the
latter.
189 Small samples are not a fatal problem when Bayesian techniques are applied
and the analysis is accompanied by appropriate assumptions. See, e.g., M. Elisabeth
Pat6-Cornell, OrganizationalAspects of EngineeringSystem Safety: The Case of Offshore Platforms, 250 SCIENCE 1210, 1212 (1990). Regarding policy discretion: although policy
discretion arguably raises different problems, it may also be worth scrutinizing, caseby-case, the basis for application of an overtly stated policy; for example, how specific
permissible exposure limits get set when courts allow rules that fix multiple-which
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ing the analogous judicial domain, decisionmakers have reason to
consider the costs as well as the benefits-which means that smaller
samples may sometimes be appropriate even if larger ones are more
representative. Since resource constraints can force a trade-off between stringency of review (for any given case in the sample) and
breadth of review, decisions about sample size should depend, in large
measure, on prior guesses about the slope and shape of the curve depicting the impact of stringency on the probability of discovering
problems in decisions.
Those choices regarding sample size should also reflect the fact
that sample size has diminishing marginal returns. Counterintuitively,
as the size of the total population of decisions increases beyond a certain point, then the proportion of that population that must be reviewed to gain a reasonably accurate picture of the whole population
actually declines. Sample sizes of between 500 and 1000 observations
may provide a revealing statistical snapshot even when drawn from
exceedingly large populations. 19 1 This suggests that auditing only a
tiny fraction of a large population and reviewing the sample carefully
might yield valuable new information. Smaller populations (for example, all the cases of the 500 or so individuals currently held in
Guantanamo) pose more of a challenge, since even a sample that constitutes a higher total percentage of the population can prove less useful in making statistical inferences if the sample is numerically small in
19
absolute terms.

2

Now juxtapose the insights of statistical and organization theory,
and several implications emerge. If the total population of cases is
large enough to allow the auditor to choose between 500 and 1000
cases without exceeding the maximum acceptable cost, then the resuiting analysis will likely exhibit desirable properties of reliability
even if the sample is a tiny proportion of the total population of cases
191 For example, if a sample of 1000 cases is drawn randomly from an infinitely
large population where one-half of the population hold a characteristic, the researcher has a 95% chance (or better) of obtaining a result that is plus or minus 3.1
percentage points of the actual distribution in a population. If a sample of 5000 is
drawn under the same conditions, the 95% confidence interval would be plus or minus 1.4 percentage points. And if a sample of 10,000 is drawn, the 95% confidence
interval would be plus or minus 1 percentage point. See ALAN D. MONROE, ESSENTIALS
OF POLITICAL RESEARCH 69 (2000). While increasing the sample size has diminishing
marginal returns in large populations, things are more complicated with smaller sampie sizes. See CAROLE SUTrON & MA-rruiEW DAVID, SOCIAL RESEARCH 154 (2004).
192 An exhaustive analysis of twenty-five cases of Guantanamo detainees, for example, constitutes about 5% of the total population. But in orthodox statistical terms it
yields far less reliable information than a sample of 1% of the total population of
100,000. Cf MONROE, supra note 191, at 69.
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but would so quickly consume auditing resources that it may prove
unworkable, at least initially. In response, auditors could design pilot
studies, some of which could be targeted to domains where underenforcement appears likely to be a more pronounced problem. The
latter is simpler but less accurate. The second problem is overcoming
the likely political resistance (from the executive branch, who would
already have reason to resist audits) that would arise if auditors further
expanded their mandate to include discretionary decisions not to act.
Part IV returns to the question of how auditors could mitigate more
general problems of political resistance over time, and explains how
such resistance could have the laudatory effect of giving auditors reason to cultivate reputations for impartiality.
C.

Which Organization Should Audit and What Standard
Should It Apply?

The prospect of overcoming political resistance to audits depends
in part on what institutional actor shoulders the burden of auditing.
Despite the existence of cases involving sample audits, some observers
may question whether ordinary courts would have the inclination, legal authority, institutional culture, or expertise necessary to engage
directly in audits. 195 The prospect of court involvement in auditing
may be simplified if judges appoint masters to undertake some of this
work and they could fashion doctrines conditioning deference on the
existence of reliable auditing done by someone else, or providing for
audits as a remedy in the (unlikely) case where litigation itself reveals
bureaucratic failures. 196 By rewarding bureaucracies with reliable audit structures, courts could advance two interrelated objectives. They
could contribute to mechanisms likely to enhance the overall quality
of discretionary decisions (relative to some defensible, socially relevant standard of quality encompassing, for example, reductions in the
probability of obvious mistakes), and they would be creating the conditions for enriching the information on the basis of which a court
can resolve specific cases. To the extent that courts are viewed as una195 For a somewhat stylized argument that the Supreme Court (or, more generally,
appellate courts) already engage in something akin to audits, see Matt Spitzer & Eric
Talley, JudicialAuditing, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 649 (2000). It should be noted, however,
that Spitzer and Talley are using the concept of auditing differently in that context, to
describe a court's decision to review a particular case at a high level of stringency
rather than a decision to select a subset of executive branch discretionary decisions at
random for more stringent review. See id. at 652.
196 They would have to do this in a way that avoids running afoul of the Supreme
Court's decision in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NaturalResources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
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searchers rarely do. Independent regulatory
engineered for balance.
public agencies can be transparently
action problems by deploying
Agencies may be able to solve collective
media attention. The
subpoena powers, and more readily generating
audits therefore echo some of
arguments for government conducted
Id. at 557-58.
of
of alternative means of adjusting stringency
198 Audits would not deprive courts
discuss
example,
for
Talley,
and
of cases. Spitzer
review even within a particular class
observable
their beliefs about a lower court and
combine
could
courts
how reviewing
that decireview
to determine whether to
characteristics of a lower court's decision
667 (indiat
195,
note
Spitzer & Talley, supra
sion (or to review it more stringently).
adopt
might
as "auditors" of lower courts,
cating how appellate courts, functioning
on
depending
asymmetric,
or
even-handed
either
be
can
"an auditing strategy that
ideolor
reviewing is (respectively) imprecision
whether the dominant reason for
that such an approach represents a departure
ogy"). The authors recognize, however,
be treated alike by courts, and acknowledge
from the principle that like cases should
675 ("One
to adhere to that principle. See id. at
that external observers expect courts
like cases should be
that
is
jurisprudence
of the basic principles of Anglo-American
treated alike.").
(and
the Independent Regulatory Commission
199 SeeJohn F. Duffy, The Death of
author).
with
file
54-57 (June 9, 2006) (on
the Birth of a New Independence?),
197

2oo6]

AUDITING EXECUTIVE

DISCRETION

those for government regulation of food and drugs, for example, in200
stead of self-regulation.
Whatever the precise organizational structure, the auditor must
be invested with the power to compel production of evidence and testimony. In the absence of such power, it would be hard for the auditor to delve into enemy combatant designations or container
inspections more aggressively than a court could. Sensitive information could be reviewed in camera, an approach that would further
weaken the argument that review should be precluded because the
information involved is too sensitive. 20 1 Because this problem has
been so often managed in other contexts, I suspect any objection to
audits relying on it is a red herring. Recent history is full of examples
where this problem has been solved. 20 2 In addition to courts reviewing the information in camera, high profile commissions like the 9/11
Commission and expert working groups routinely get security clearances and access to classified information. 20 3 The resulting, publicly
disclosed work product either omits classified information or provides
some redacted summary version of it.
Regardless of whether the case involves sensitive information or
not, what standard would the auditor use to evaluate it? Ideally the
statutes or constitutional provisions implicated in the discretionary decisions would provide some standard for the auditor to use, even when
the standard is too vague for courts to apply. Or the auditing authority can analyze whether a number of statutes and constitutional doctrines together could be taken to imply conditions on the use of
200 Cf. SUNSTEIN, supra note 95, at 45 ("In some circumstances, (government] interference may produce significant benefits for trivial costs ....
[R]egulatory programs are necessary to solve collective action and coordination problems.").
201 Under existing law, judges sometimes handle sensitive information and use it
to make decisions in cases. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 715-16 (1974).
It is hard to see why audits of targeted discretion should be avoided on the grounds
that the underlying discretionary decision depends on sensitive information. If the
argument is that it is dangerous or problematic to share the results of audits of
targeted discretion because the policy domain requires complete secrecy even of the
quality of decisions being made, then that argument should be advanced on its own
merits and it should have to overcome a high barrier. See, e.g., Ex pane Quirin, 317

U.S. 1, 24-25 (1942). Even in the prosecution of alleged Al Qaeda terrorist Zacharias
Moussaoui, the federal government provided Moussaoui's defense team with the opportunity to review classified information in the context of the criminal discovery process. See A. John Radsan, The Moussaoui Case: The Mess From Minnesota, 31 WM.
MITCHELL L. REv. 1417, 1433 (2005).
202 See, e.g., Jifry v. FAA, 370 F.3d 1174 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
203 See NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ArACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMIS.
SION REPORT (2004).
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20 4 The auditor could even use statements from
discretionary powers.
the audited cases seem to be
the executive branch itself to see 2whether
05
In some circumstances, where the
consistent with those statements.
standard to fill in gaps left by
executive refuses to articulate an explicit
the auditor itselfcould articuexecutive, legislative, or judicial silence,
is, by the way, what the GAO and IG
late a reasonable standard (which
audit "broad management pracdo in related contexts, when they
insights drawn from constitutional
tices"). The standard might reflect
or even statutes' legislative
interpretation, policy considerations,
history.

of an Audit?
What Should Depend on the Outcome
of audit results. As an
A final issue concerns the consequence
that the auditor labors under a
initial thought experiment, imagine
of its investigation will simply be
default presumption that the results
of audits may ultimately
announced to the public. A striking feature
how executive authority is policed
prove their capacity to enhance
What this would accomplish dewithout directly delivering relief.
D.

has disis exactly what the Supreme Court
204 Deriving such implicit standards
Court
the
There
(1985),
821
U.S.
v. Chaney, 470
couraged in cases such as Heckler
almost always
use their enforcement powers are
held that agency decisions not to under the terms of the Administrative Procedure
"committed to agency discretion"
is where
Chaney, 470 U.S. at 837-38. The exception
Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701 (a) (2) (2000).
which
against
standard
a
as
use
could
that a court
of
a statute provides "clear guidelines"
face
the
on
when no such standard is apparent
to judge agency decisions. Indeed,
overcomes
standard
that the absence of such a
the statute, then courts tend to find
See Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182,
reviewability.
of
what is otherwise a presumption
to recognize far
sometimes gloss over (but seem
192-94 (1993). What these cases
to which
non-delegation doctrine) is the extent
more explicitly in cases involving the
action
government
continuum, where virtually any
the existence of standards is on a
accordance
in
evaluated
be
to prosecute) could
or inaction (including decisions not
480 F.2d
exception, see Adams v. Richardson,
an
For
criterion.
with some defensible
"consciously
has
an exception where an agency
1159, 1162 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (finding
an abdicathat is so extreme as to amount to
policy"
and expressly adopted a general
be the
should
courts
that
This is not to suggest
tion of its statutory responsibility).
independent
discretion audits (perhaps some
primary actors in conducting targeted
would have more
non-judges
and
judges
of
auditing authority including a mixture
reluctance to
It is, rather, to point out that courts'
flexibility to articulate standards).
should not
statute
a
of
face
the
them missing on
articulate standards when they find
an enterprise is fruitless.
be taken as an indication that such
for being a
the CIA Director can fire someone
205 For example, if statutes say that
review
could
audit
the
then
what that means,
national security risk and let him define
or it
results,
the
announce
and
see if it is plausible
the definition with particular care to
Chaney,
Cf
"national security" in related contexts.
could rely on agency definitions of
could be chalan agency decision not to enforce
470 U.S. at 836 (suggesting that
circumstances).
to act in specified
lenged if the agency itself has committed
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and the mass public, which can
pends on the reactions of legislators 20 6
Not everyone among the
vary depending on the circumstances.
are applied on their behalf
public would care enough about how laws
results revealing arbitrariness in
to respond with indignation to audit
raising money for terrorists
the process to determine who is allegedly
Nonetheless, as Part III
or engaging in environmental violations.
bureaucracies turn out to already
notes, reports from existing audit
national newspapers and televihave generated dozens of stories in
to
20 7 Thus, public disclosure may have the potential
sion networks.
game as the executive branch
impact crucial features of the political
seeks to demonstrate its competence.
may accomplish little
On the other hand, mere public discourse
and the mass public have other
where the media, organized interests,
is their flexibility. The audiconcerns. Recall that audits' touchstone
belated sanctions whenever audits
tor might be empowered to impose
improperly barred from entering
reveal problematic cases. A woman
Assets that should not have
the country could be allowed to return.
Enemy combatants could be set
been frozen could be unblocked.
though it obviously raises
free. This is certainly a principled position, could ultimately affect
the audits, and
certain costs associated 2with
0 A third approach is for the results of autheir political feasibility.
standards, such as review of more
dits to trigger additional procedural
targeting areas where problems
decisions through stratified sampling
more important, auditors and
have been newly discovered. Perhaps
in a symbiotic relationcourts may gradually come to view themselves
deference to executive action in
ship, as courts adjust their calculus of
of audit programs for particresponse to audit results or the existence
adjust the standards they use to
ular sectors of activity, and auditors
of statutes or constituaudit cases in response to judicial, elaborations
tional doctrines.
alternatives is not one that
In any event, the choice among these
to depend heavily on the politican be taken in a vacuum. It is likely
with NaPolitical and Economic Interactions
206 See Asher Arian & Sigalit Olzaeker,
65-71
58,
Period in Israel, 43 J. CONFLICT RESOL.
tional Security Opinion: The Gulf War
Energy
the
to
System Support and Public Response
(1999); David 0. Sears et al., Political
(1978).
Crisis, 22 Am. J. POL. Sci. 56, 66-75
text.
accompanying
and
207 See infra notes 225-28
one might imagine a situation
here,
argument
the
develop
208 Although I do not
the ability to grant relief in
trade-off
system would
where the designers of the audit
cases or to do so
economic resources to audit more
exchange for the political and
where supequilibrium
for example, reflect an
more intensely. Truth commissions,
and
political
for
exchange
in
punitive power
porters have likely traded off explicit
economic resources.
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The key is to evaluate the
cal considerations discussed in Part IV.
of what benefits could be proproblem of remedies not only in terms
(more generally) how differvided to aggrieved individuals, but also
impact agencies' willingness to
ent remedial schemes are likely to
their work to avoid future
learn from their mistakes and structure
engineering, analogies
abuses. In short, through careful institutional
some experimentation, most of the
to existing institutions, andsolved.
We might then ask whether such
"problems" identified can be
problems have. been solved already.
III.

WHY

STATUS Quo
REFORMS CONTRAST WITH THE

on court review of execThe analysis began by focusing primarily
have distinctive legal powers
utive discretion. In reality, though courts
component of a larger web of
and responsibilities, they are but one
overseeing executive discretion.
institutions potentially capable of
means through which executive
Formal judicial review is but one
this depends to a considerable
power may be restrained-and even
of government officials, organextent on its interaction with the views
the value of compliance with
ized interests, and the public regarding
2 0 9 Other factors include some combination of the
judicial decisions.
and Inspectors General,
press, audit bureaucracies such as the GAO
and social movements drawlegislators, and even organized interests
public.
ing support from among the mass
relevant, two observations
unquestionably
are
factors
While these
on executive discretion. First, in
are worth making about their impact
the media, and the mass
many cases, legislators, organized interests,
executive discretion in
public become a viable means of disciplining formal review mechathrough
2 10
response to the information generated
executive activities.
overseeing
in
role
judiciary's
nisms, such as the
limitations on judicial review
Because of judicial review's importance,
discretion that emerges-and
may distort the picture of executive
factors. Politicians
therefore the relevance of the aforementioned
to generate that information
and the media sometimes have reason
up some potentially useful tidbit
through investigations that may turn
See generally LAWRENCE

IN THE 20TH CENTURY
FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW

(2002)

those imin various contexts, but particularly
(noting that important legal decisions
therewith);
conformity
social
corresponding
plicating race relations, did not produce
AM. POL.
of Democracy and the Rule of Law, 91
Foundations
Political
The
Weingast,
Barry
destability
democratic
theory to find that
SC. REV. 245 (1997) (employing game
pends on self-enforcing equilibrium).
(2004) (discussTHAT'S FIT TO SELL 15-17
210 SeeJAMES HAMILTON, ALL THE NEWS
forms
their incentives against resource-intensive
ing the economics of the media and
of news generation).
209
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of executive malfeasance (from their perspective). There is no compelling reason to think that these erstwhile investigators will routinely
face sufficient incentives to investigate, which is why observers assign
such relative importance to judicial review as a means of generating
information with the potential to provoke political and journalistic responses. 2 11 Even the otherwise laudable Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) 2 1 2 is no reliable bulwark against bureaucratic misconduct.
Such misconduct may afflict responses to FOIA requests in ways that
are difficult for courts to monitor, and the law itself is riddled with
21 3
exceptions.
Second, whether audit bureaucracies or legislators engage in audits or something similar is an empirical question. Accordingly, this
Part examines the behavior of two sets of actors capable of producing
the sort of accountability-enhancing information that intrusive judicial review can. The GAO and the IG offices, which might be termed
"audit bureaucracies," possess a broad mandate to audit federal government activities and produce information about how laws are implemented. Although they operate in a complex political environment
shaped by the legislature and the executive branch, they are not subject to the constraints that ostensibly lead courts to fashion stringency
standards applying across the board to all potential cases in a particular class. Similarly, the legislature itself can use its investigative powers
directly to generate information about how executive discretion is
exercised.
In fact, the value of supplementing judicial review with a new program for auditing executive discretion depends largely on whether or
not such audits are already commonplace. Perhaps audits of executive discretion involving random samples of discrete applications of
legal authority to specific individuals or groups are regular features of
the work already carried out by the GAO and Inspectors General offices. These audit bureaucracies were, after all, created to audit the
government, and their jurisdiction has expanded to include investigating the management of government programs. Their activities are
sometimes directed by legislators, who (in turn) can proceed with
their own audits. Do they?
211 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 209, at 280-90 (discussing the role of civil rights court
cases in generating information that can galvanize political and journalistic responses
to public officials' decisions).
212 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-557 (2000).
213 See, e.g., Christina E. Wells, "NationalSecurity" Information and the Freedom of Information Act, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1195 (2004); Amy E. Rees, Note, Recent Developments
Regarding the Freedom of Information Act: A "Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, Perhaps
Both,"44 Duoe L.J. 1183 (1995).
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Audits
Audit BureaucraciesDo Not OrdinarilyPerform
is generally "no." These
For the audit bureaucracies the answer
of work on bureaucratic
agencies undertake a tremendous amount
valuable either from a social
performance, which can be considered
Congress-focused view emphawelfare perspective or from a narrower,
that created and exert recurring
sizing the interests of the lawmakers
The scope of their authority is
influence over the audit bureaucracies.
has the power to examine "all
21 4
quite broad. The GAO, for example,
of public money.
disbursement
the
to
way
matters" relating in some
departments have similarly
The Inspectors General offices in federal
21 5 Yet they appear to rarely perform audits of execubroad mandates.
stratified) sampling of legally
tive discretion involving random (or
assessed against a defensible
consequential discretionary decisions,
or articulated by the auditors).
standard (either a pre-existing one
has spawned a small
The trajectory of the audit bureaucracies
jurisdiction, organization,
literature on their historical origin, legal
of
2 16 But relatively little is known about what the reports
and culture.
deto
what methods they use
these audit bureaucracies are about,
contain recommendations
velop their analyses, whether these reports
whether any of this gets media
that agencies actually implement, and
to the present project because
attention. These questions are relevant
of the kinds of audits I recomthey affect whether there is a deficit
something about how audit
mend, and their answers help us learn
supervision of executive
bureaucracies could enhance their
discretion.
from a recent pilot study of
Some preliminary answers emerge
sample of 400 Inspectors General
the audit bureaucracies, analyzing a
2 17 The reports in
last five years.
and GAO reports issued during the
agencies with a broad
2 18 The
the sample pertain to five major government
responsibilities.
administrative
and
regulatory
of
spectrum
of reports auditing execuanalysis sought to ascertain the proportion
A.

214 31 U.S.C. § 712(1) (2000).
Pub. L. No. 95-452, 92 Stat. 1101 (codified
215 See Inspector General Act of 1978,
5 U.S.C.).
as amended in scattered sections of
PUBLIC INROGER R. TRASK, DEFENDER OF THE
117;
note
supra
LIGHT,
e.g.,
216 See,
OFFICE, 1921-1966 (1996).
TEREST: THE GENERAL ACCOUNTING
GAO and IG Report Pilot Study: A Preliminary
Cudllar,
217 See Mariano-Florentino
to "Audit"
by the GAO and Inspectors General
Analysis of the Methodologies Used
file with author).
Federal Agencies (Apr. 1, 2006) (on
sampling design focusing on these agencies
stratified
a
218 The analysis employs
studying
empirical project depend on closely
because some of the goals of the larger
specific agenof
number
small
a
and
the interactions between the audit bureaucracies
cies with differing functions. Id. At 1-2.

2wo6]

AUDITING

EXECUTIVE

DISCRETION

tive discretion, which has been defined as involving: (1) the selection
of a random sample (2) of executive branch legal determinations affecting individuals or groups and (3) identifying or defining a stan21 9
dard against which to assess such decisions.
Fewer than one in five reports in the sample appear to use any
process of random selection of cases from a larger population, and
the vast majority of these focused on the traditional financial accounting functions that convey almost no information about how an agency
uses its legal discretion to affect directly the fortunes of individuals or
groups. 220 Meanwhile, less than two percent of the reports in the sample involved audits of executive discretion. 22 1 And even among these
219 Id. at 1.
220 For a rare example of an Inspector General report that comes close to achieving the goal of systematically analyzing executive discretion, see OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT ON SEPTEMBER 11 DETAINEES'
ALLEGATIONS OF ABUSE AT THE METROPOLITAN DETENTION CENTER IN BROOKLYN, NEW

YoRK (2003). Although this report focuses primarily on describing the treatment of
immigration detainees at two government facilities, it did undertake a thorough review of the files describing the status and treatment of the 762 aliens held in connection with the September 11 investigation. Id. at 1. While the report does not leverage
the insight that fewer cases reviewed more thoroughly can sometimes yield greater
information, its searing analysis proves so informative in part (in all likelihood) because the investigators conceived of their task in terms of generating information,
rather than in terms of resolving particular cases. Id. at 5-7. The vast majority of
other reports surveyed involve either the use of interviews and non-random analysis of
documents to make broad policy recommendations, or traditional financial audits.
Of course, in some sense the GAO and Inspector General reports that monitor any
aspect of government performance are examining the application of executive discretion because they are examining how agencies perform in some (ordinarily quite general) aspect of a mission they are lawfully empowered to undertake. While all of these
studies expand the scope of information (and in some cases generate considerable
media attention), there is a striking gap in the methodology and subject matter coverage of these reports substantially overlapping with the audits of executive discretion
recommended here. Specifically, what the reports almost never encompass are systematic audits of repetitive, discrete applications of executive power affecting individuals or groups using sampling.
221 Cu~llar, supra note 217, at 21. Four trained research assistants coded the GAO
and IG reports. The stratified random sample was drawn from among reports completed between March 1999 and March 2005, and focused on the following five departments (or their components): the Department of Homeland Security, the
Department ofJustice, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Labor Department,
and the Department of Defense. Id. at 2. Of the sample of 400 reports analyzed,
about sixty-eight (or seventeen percent) used some form of random sampling. Id. at
21. The bulk of these did so in the context of a traditional financial audit. Only seven
reports in the total sample undertook audits of executive discretion. Id. These covered matters such as the proportion of background checks conducted by the Transportation Security Agency on prospective airport screeners that met statutory
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reports, the predominant concern was with federal grants and contracting decisions. Investigative and enforcement activities were not
addressed in the small proportion of reports auditing executive discretion. Some reports occasionally chronicle problems in administrative
systems like those governing aviation security. Nonetheless, audits of
executive discretion are essentially missing from the picture of the audit bureaucracies' work. For instance, the GAO's otherwise thorough
report on the Transportation Security Agency's computerized aviation
security system shows how carefully the agency reviewed the architecture of the computer algorithm and the management practices associated with the systems. 22 2 It did not, however, pick a subset of names to

inquire exhaustively how they ended up on the list or what evidence
supported that determination. 22 3 Determining the proportion of the
audit bureaucracies' current resources that should focus on auditing
executive discretion is not the focus of this project. Instead the point
is to highlight the shortcomings of traditional judicial review, to suggest that audits of executive discretion-were they to occur more regularly-could substantially address the resulting gaps, and to
emphasize that the costs (measured in a number of ways) associated
with such audits should be lower than the costs of meaningfully expanding traditional judicial review. Whatever the value of what the
audit bureaucracies do, their tendency to focus attention on traditional financial auditing and thematic management analyses has limited their capacity to resolve problems associated with the current
2 24
scope of executive discretion.

standards and the extent of FEMA payouts for certain disaster relief programs. A

separate comparison sample of fifty reports randomly selected from among those
dealing with departments not in the stratified sample (covering similar dates) yielded
similar results. Id.
222

U.S. GEN.

GAO-04-385, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL COM14-17 (2004).
223 Id. For a study of Inspectors General revealing that only about ten percent of
their audits sought to measure program results as opposed to financial, procurement,
or management performance, see Kathryn E. Newcomer, Opportunities and Incentives
far Improving Program Quality: Auditing and Evaluation, 54 PUB. ADM1N. REV. 147, 152
(1994).
224 Moreover, the audit bureaucracies have incentives to distort their portfolio of
activities towards a focus on procurement, contracting, grants, and financial audits
and away from auditing executive discretion (particularly in the absence of congressional pressure to do the latter), relative to what is likely to be most socially desirable.
The former activities are more likely to produce unambiguous financial results that
can more easily support arguments for preserving and expanding agency resources.
The latter may exacerbate the political animosity between the audit bureaucracies
and ordinary executive agencies. See infraPart 1V. Accordingly, changing the existing
distribution of activity among the audit bureaucracies to favor audits of executive disACCOUNTING OFFICE,

MITTEES, AVIATION SECURITY

20061
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ta

could be encouraged to
The possibility that audit bureaucracies
discretion without entirely neglectperform more audits of executive
reactions worth discussing.
ing other issues may provoke two skeptical
audits of executive discretion
First, there is the matter of whether
GAO and IG office reports get
would be salient to the public. In fact,
in the print and television media.
a considerable amount of attention
in the New York Times and in tranAn analysis of the number of stories
January 2002 and January
scripts of television news stories between
reveals that the audit bureau2005 mentioning the GAO or IG offices
22 5 Nearly 1000 articles
attention.
cracies receive considerable media
New York Times mention the GAO
during this period appearing in the
indi226 A random sample of 200 of those news stories
or IG offices.
the
involving
percent of the stories
cates that, while only about three
percent of those mentioning the
GAO appear on page one, about ten
are also discussed on broadcast
IG offices do so. Audit bureaucracies
these media (and during the same
news and cable channels. Even in
mention the various IG oftime period), nearly 500 news segments 227
These figures exceed the
GAO.
22 8
fices, and about thirty mention the
cabinet agencies.
federal
many
by
garnered
number of mentions
an agency would merely igSecond, the question arises whether
of an audit revealing unfavorable
nore the prescriptive implications
learning bonus from audits
performance. If it did, then the promised
Although data are not yet available
would be unlikely to materialize.
of the IG offices, I have already gathregarding the recommendations
10,000 discrete recommendaered data on all of the approximately
last fifteen years. The data cover
tions made by the GAO over the
federal government agencies,
recommendations to the full range of
of
the State Department. An analysis
from the Interior Department to
the GAO makes recommendations
such data proves revealing. After
generally conducts follow-up interto an agency in its reports, its staff
document reviews, and issue queries
views, additional investigations,
welfare
distribution of activity from a social
cretion is likely to yield a more defensible
perspective.
database for the
2006 on Westlaw's New York Times
225 A search ran on October 26,
General' or
"'Inspector
January 2005 using terms
time period of January 2002 to
Office'" reAccountability
Office' or 'Government
'GAO' or 'General Accounting
Broadcast
search ran in Westlaw's United States
sulted in 1354 documents. The same
528 documents.
Transcripts database resulted in
225.
226 See supra note
227 Id.
as often (230
of Energy is mentioned only half
228 For example, the Department
of Transporbroadcast transcripts; the Department
times) during the same period in
are menagencies
cabinet
transcripts. Many other
tation is mentioned only in 181
tioned even less often.

NOTRE

DAME

LAW

REVIEW

[VOL. 82:1

to the agency leadership. The audit agency then determines (on the
basis of these qualitative methods) whether a given recommendation
is implemented sometime during the next four years. 2 29 Nonetheless,
about seventy-nine percent of recommendations made between October 6, 1989 and February 3, 2005 were implemented, perhaps in part
because of the potential media attention reports generate.
These implementation results must be interpreted with a measure of sagacity. The extent to which recommendations are adopted
may be endogenous to what the recommendation is-with simpler
ones (i.e., "write a report on the quality of the vehicle fleet for the
Secret Service") being implemented much more than complicated or
difficult ones ("reduce the extent to which the Secret Service works on
simple credit card fraud cases instead of critical infrastructure protection"). The adoption of recommendations is likely to be influenced
by political factors, such as the extent of division in appropriations
and authorizing subcommittees that oversee the agency in question.
It is likely too that departments with different bureaucratic structures,
institutional cultures, and particularly those with greater prestige,
have different reactions to the GAO recommendations. What makes
little sense is to reject the relevance of the audit bureaucracies, even if
they do not currently perform the sorts of audits that would generate
critical missing information about the use and abuse of executive
discretion.
B.

Neither Do Legislators

Another possible setting where audits of executive discretion
could take place is in the legislature, where hearings to oversee the
bureaucracy are routine and legislators often complain loudly about
what agencies have done. As it turns out, most legislative oversight
activity has virtually nothing to do with systematically auditing
targeted discretion. In Part IV, I suggest some of the reasons why, as
with the audit bureaucracies, there seem to be so few audits of executive discretion. In what follows I want to provide a brief outline of
what legislative oversight activity tends to look like, and how this is
different from targeted discretion audits.
Legislators tend to prioritize the investigation and monitoring of
executive bureaucracies. They depend on oversight of the bureaucracy to achieve their goals. Soon after legislators arrive in Washington, many of them almost invariably find they can reap considerable
229 The agency (quite plausibly) assumes that if a recommendation is not implemented within four years of being made, it probably will not be. Telephone Interview
with U.S. Gen. Accounting Office official, in Wash., D.C. (Jan. 6, 2005).
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allows them to achieve derewards from oversight activity. Oversight
making the govIt also lets them claim credit for

sired policy goals.
effectively. As a consequence,
ernment work more efficiently and
bewildering array of forms, ina
on
legislative oversight activity takes
hearcommittee and subcommittee
cluding-among others-formal
practices, direct contact
ings, staff investigations of bureaucratic
leadership, meetings with the
between a legislator and an agency's
serin pressing a bureaucracy into
White House to enlist its support
230 In the mid-1980s,
process.
vice, and control of the appropriations
and Thomas Schwartz intropolitical scientists Matthew McCubbins
durable framework for thinking
duced what has become an incredibly
23
overthe bureaucracy. 1 Police patrol
about legislative oversight of
to
their time, staff, and other resources
sight involves legislators using
of agency outputs-primarily
engage in fairly constant vigilance
2 32 In contrast,
hearings.
through staff investigations and committee
less constant attention from legislators
"fire alarm" oversight requires
be pul2 33 Instead, legislators wait for "fire alarms" to
and their staff.
of the public (occasionally, perled by interest groups and portions
perceived
media attention to some
haps when galvanized by
legislators
this sort of activity,
235
regulatory problem).234 To encourageAdministrative Procedure Act
federal
the
create procedures such as
Act 23 6 that let groups more easily
Information
of
and the Freedom
(imrely on these parties to assist
learn what's going on. Legislators
retwo
involve
In short, fire alarms
plicitly) in the oversight process.
a
occasion,
on interest groups (or, on
lated features: (1) reliance
to
(2) episodic legislative responses
politically engaged citizenry), and
some
express profound concern with
instances where these groups
aspect of bureaucratic activity.
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Typically, legislators concerned
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to pursue, the responses of organized
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to all but the most politically
interests constitute valuable information
perspecas it is from a narrow political
secure legislators. But useful
the opposite of a random audit.
tive, fire alarm oversight is precisely
discrea procedure to audit targeted
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235-44 (1989).
230 SeeJAMES Q. WILSON, BuREAUCRACY
Congressional Oversight Overlooked:
Schwartz,
231 See Mathew McCubbins & Thomas
AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 166-68 (1984).
Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28
232 Id. at 166.
233 Id.
234 Id.
(2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
235 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706
236 Id. § 551-557.
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tion (they have not so far), then fire alarms would virtually never involve auditing, but rather sharp responses when problems have
already surfaced. Moreover, because targeted discretion often
(though not always) affects individuals or groups without ready access
to political power, fire alarm oversight would be particularly unlikely
to uncover problems. In contrast, police patrol methods are much
more consistent with the kind of audits I describe. Yet there is little
evidence from congressional testimony and hearings that this is the
sort of oversight that legislators do directly. In fact, what their public
statements seem to suggest is that if anyone is doing the kinds of audits that reveal problems with government, it is the GAO and the IG
2 37
offices, not their own staff.

This is not to say that congressional investigations lack any value
as vehicles for legislative oversight, or even as contributors to social
welfare. Congressional investigations often uncover important trends
or problems in bureaucratic activity, whether such investigations are
triggered by fire alarms or they arise from more pervasive police patrol methods. While it is true that some forms of legislative control
can substitute for other mechanisms-like audits-two basic facts
might nonetheless make audits of executive discretion distinctive compared to most of what legislatures, courts, and audit bureaucracies
currently undertake. First, legislators train their attention on what
catches their attention, not on a random sample of discretionary decisions. Decisions that are not reviewed randomly (or through a stratified random sample) tend to provide a biased sample. The results
skew the picture of bureaucratic activity that emerges, either because
of inherent characteristics in the sample or because the players being
"audited" strategically distort what they are doing in the decisions
more likely to be audited. Cases that are not reviewed at all do not
become the subject of any legislative, political, or public pressure.
Second, even when legislators and their staff choose to focus on a particular agency function, their oversight does not necessarily imply review of specific decisions. As with the audit bureaucracies, oversight
hearings may focus on systemic issues such as an agency's policy priorities or its handling of obvious crises. While staff may occasionally
review random samples of case files, this is not a routine component
of legislative hearings. From a prescriptive point of view, the results
may provide less explicit-and instead more ambiguous-findings,
which are harder to interpret and have less to say about whether government is performing effectively.
237

See, e.g.,

LIGHT,

supra note 117, at 42.
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IV. WHY AUDITs FACE CONSTRAINTS
Judicial review is likely to do a poorjob of generating information

useful in the oversight of executive discretion, because routine executive branch discretionary decisions are often committed to agency discretion or reviewed at such a low level of stringency that there is little
or no meaningful chance of discovering problems. From a social welfare perspective, supplementing judicial review with audits is valuable.
Audits could improve our ability to monitor bureaucracies at a reasonable cost. Even acknowledging that legislators and executive branch
officials are often divided among themselves and from each other with
respect to what constitutes effective performance, audits may reduce
the risk of errors and bureaucratic failures that dominant political coalitions would like to prevent. Yet, audits of executive discretion
rarely happen. Why?
A.

PoliticalActors Have Incentives to Undermine Audits

Two important sets of actors who have stakes in the work of the
executive branch may find that their goals cut against audits of executive discretion. Officials in the executive branch (and their allies in
the legislature) could institute an audit system internally. They could
support its implementation by the GAO and iG offices. Or they could
advocate for it in the legislature. The other set of players involves
those legislators (and their allies among organized interest groups)
who are generally opposed to expansive power in the executive
38
branch.
On rare occasions, formal audits of executive discretion develop a
political constituency within the executive branch. 23 9 But this state of
affairs rarely occurs. Instead, other things being equal, executive
branch officials should react adversely to the prospect of parting with
discretion. 240 Discretion helps authorities carry out the functions that
238 Obviously there are still other players who matter. There may be moderate
legislators, for example, who have an interest in restraining abuses but fundamentally
accept the argument that intrusive judicial review may be too costly. I suspect both
that these actors could play a crucial and constructive role in promoting bureaucratic
changes that could contribute to improvements in how we oversee targeted discretion. I also imagine that their numbers have been thinned by the increasing polarization of politics described by some recent work among political scientists. See Nolan
McCarty et al., Political Polarization and Income Inequality 5-11 (lan. 27, 2003) (on
file with author).
239 See supra Part I.D.1.
240 Sometimes things are not equal, as when leaders in the executive branch seem
to avoid responsibility for politically controversial functions holding little prospect of
generating a public reward, such as choosing a site for a nuclear waste dump.
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they are expected to, like keeping threatening people out of the country, prevailing in military operations abroad, or (at least some of the
time) keeping industrial workplaces safe. Discretion is also valuable
because it helps create certain impressions among superiors, legislators on appropriations committees, interest groups, and the public.
People respond to what they can see. Executive discretion lets government officials (or their subordinates) choose what seems to be happening in a given area of the law. It stands to reason that losing some of
this power is not a welcome prospect. Neither is it desirable to face
the additional costs and the possibility of embarrassment that come
with more stringent audits. One might expect supporters of executive
power in the legislature to take a similar position. 2 41 And some officials may simply crave power for its own sake. In short, other things
being equal, executive authorities and their allies should be expected
to seek more discretion, and less review. Unless those authorities have
reason to limit their flexibility in order to demonstrate their competence, 242 these players would probably prefer to avoid the embarrassment of an audit that does not show them succeeding, and to retain
the benefits of the flexibility implied by that discretion.
The political viability of audits in the legislature is far from assured. It depends on the extent to which legislators with divided goals
nonetheless believe that audits are worth the political price because
they can uncover errors of shared concern. Such coalitions are not
common, but neither are they impossible. In Congress, lawmakers
who differed sharply regarding the re-authorization of the Patriot
Act's investigative provisions nonetheless appeared to share an interest in limiting the most egregious law enforcement abuses of certain
powers. 243 Such shared concerns help explain why the most recent
revision of the Act includes a rare audit provision applying to federal
law enforcement information requests using the Act's subpoena and
244
national security letter powers.
241 Unless, of course, their support of executive branch power is overwhelmed by
incentives to support (for example) legislative power.
242 For a discussion of the possibility that executive authorities could limit their
discretion as a means of sending a costly signal of their competence to the public, see
Cu~llar, supra note 139, at 57-58.
243 The legislators favoring the investigative provisions limit the risk that the authority will be used in an embarrassing manner. The legislators opposed obtain a
partial victory valued by supporting constituencies and a means of generating information that could change the course of future political debates about the relevant
legal provisions. See generally Bendor & Moe, supra note 173.
244 See Michael Sandier, Proposed Changes to the Anti-Terronsm Law, CONG. Q. WKLY.
REP., Dec. 26, 2005, at 3394.
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Audits fare less well where legislators find their political goals and
the production of information through audits to be in tension. Think
first of the legislators who tend to distrust what the executive branch is
doing. As noted earlier, legislators tend to lack incentives to audit
rather than to rely on police patrol methods. Even assuming that the
conditions are present to make these legislators want to use police
patrol methods instead of just waiting for an interest group to complain, it is not obvious that the critics of executive power would want
to press for rigorous audits instead of simply polarizing the debate or
attempting to embarrass their political opponents. 2 45 A highly polarized debate has some benefits. It may galvanize support among certain constituencies. And opposition legislators (along with their allies
in external interest groups), enthralled by the prospect of an optimal
gamble, may prefer to win across the board than to support solutions
that no doubt seem to some like flimsy half-measures.
One can tell much the same story about advocacy organizations
outside government. If the issue is the treatment of enemy combatants, for example, organizations such as Human Rights Watch may
strongly prefer a system where authorities implement the Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld decision 246 in a way that drastically cuts down on executive
discretion. Audits may seem like a poor alternative by comparison.
The choice between promoting audits (as a compromise) or pressing
for a more stringent standard of deference across the board thus depends, as before, at least in part on the players' subjective assessment
of the probability that they will prevail in advocating for the acrossthe-board standard. No doubt some determined advocates of more
stringent judicial review would ground their commitments on their
perception that courts are more politically insulated from legislative
or executive pressures than the audit bureaucracies. They may laud
courts' role in articulating the underlying nature of constitutional
commitments, or to directly impose reforms on public bureaucracies
through structural injunctions. 24 7 In practice, these principled rationales may exacerbate a perception among critics of executive authority that measures short of substantially more stringent judicial
supervision would yield little or no benefit.
245 Of course, audits may in fact embarrass the executive branch. That depends
on what the opponents think the audits will reveal. But whatever political benefits
audits can provide must be weighed against the opportunity costs that I discuss above.
246 Hamdi v Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
247 Because these observations raise valid concerns, the approach described here
is designed to work in tandem with, rather than to entirely supplement, judicial review. See supra note 164.
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In short, while political coalitions supporting audits are not impossible to achieve, polarization among political advocates seeking
maximal advantage in their efforts to expand or limit judicial review
diminishes the extent of political interest in review mechanisms that
may be socially optimal. When players have more polarized views
about executive branch power, substantive policy and law, or both,
they probably have less to gain from investing in a compromise. Conceptually, audits embody just such a compromise. Their architecture
necessarily resonates most with observers who simultaneously worry
about the drawbacks and benefits of greater review of executive discretion, and least with those for whom such a syncretic exercise seems
unnecessary.
B.

InstitutionalInertia May Exaggerate the Value of Adjudication

To the extent that lawyers concerned with the exercise of discretionary powers view themselves as zealous advocates on behalf of individual clients, they may find little solace in a system that randomly
selects cases for review. Even observers without individual clients to
represent may naturally seek to focus attention on strategies to obtain
direct relief for aggrieved individuals. This conception is likely to exist in some tension with the notion that more can be learned through
reviewing fewer cases more thoroughly, even if the role of audits is to
supplement rather than replace such review. Observers emphasize
the value of adjudication as a recourse that should be available to, and
provide a remedy to, similarly situated parties. Judgments that do not
provide a remedy may strike some observers as ridiculous, and why
some scholars have persuasively shown how it makes little sense to
think about adjudication constitutional rights without "equilibrating"
24
that adjudicatory process with the remedies in question.
Audits of executive discretion do not conform to these assumptions. In a narrow sense, they randomly privilege some peoplewhose cases are selected for audits-and not others. They do not provide an obvious remedy, though it is certainly possible to forge a systern that makes remedial contributions by affecting the ordinary
course of judicial review. 249 They seem, as a result, to be ill-fitting
proxies for a persistent set of concerns that underlie the normative
case for less deferential adjudication. It is undoubtedly true that constitutional provisions and values may require adjudication, and that
248

See DarylJ. Levinson, Rights Essentialismand Remedial Equilibration,99 COLU M. L.

REv. 857, 926 (1999).
249 See supra Part I.C.
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many deficiencies in adjudication are best remedied through changes
in adjudication.
Nonetheless, it seems equally clear that the prevailing conception
of adjudication could unduly dampen interest in audits. It promotes
the misleading sense that the value of audits are primarily seen where
an individual abuse (or mistake) is discovered, and corrected. Instead, the point of audits is to shed light on the entire system and how
it works. This has always been a concern of adjudication as well, but
perhaps it sometimes gets lost amidst the pressing rhetoric about protecting individual rights. Courts inclined to serve as a counterweight
can do so by crediting, during arbitrary and capricious or substantial
evidence review, agencies who incorporate credible audits of their decisions, or who have been subject to such audits from the GAO and
Inspectors General offices recently. Although Vermont Yankee Nuclear
Power Corp. v. NaturalResources Defense Council, Inc. 250 and similar cases
preclude the full range of judicial elaboration of new procedures, it
does not strain the existing scope of review to suggest that courts
should attend to the internal and external procedures shaping the
2 51
extent to which a specific agency decision becomes arbitrary.
Indeed, while Vermont Yankee may arguably limit courts' abilities
to directly impose audit requirements through expansive interpretations of the Administrative Procedure Act,252 audits seem directly germane to the familiar procedural due process balancing framework
ordinarily traced to Mathews v. Eldridge.253 By privileging the importance of accuracy-enhancing mechanisms, Eldridgeimplies that (where
protected interests are at stake) auditors' work could illuminate questions central to procedural due process analysis, such as the
probability that individuals or groups will suffer erroneous deprivations under existing (as opposed to plaintiff-requested) procedures. 254
As they respond to conceptual and political objections, auditors (and
audit supporters) may thus find solid ground from which to empha250 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
251 Cf Bressman, supra note 2, at 555 (laying out a new theory for "examining
more directly the concern for arbitrariness").
252 Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 524 (holding that courts are generally not free to
impose additional procedural requirements beyond those established by the APA).
253 424 U.S. 319, 323-28 (1976).
254 See id. at 334-35 (establishing a three-part test focusing on increasing accuracy
in administrative decisionmaking). Indeed, the frequent relative absence of an empirical basis informing courts' determinations of what process is due in Eldridge-like
cases raises the question of how courts are currently making these determinations,
and how these might be best evaluated.
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Since the GAO and IG offices were
of these bureaucracies is rooted
least one factor shaping the priorities
be
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2 56 The audit bureaucracies' legislative overseers expect
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vehicles for legislators to achieve
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supra note 117, at 42 (quoting
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Id. at 43-45.
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revenues. 25 7 In some ways, these constraints are a reflection of legislators' own aforementioned incentives. Legislators can nudge or even
force these agencies to undertake work the lawmakers desire. Given
these realities, it is not surprising that the audit bureaucracies so consistently seem to embrace the fire alarm (and, to a more limited extent, the police patrol) approach associated with legislative oversight.
It proves difficult to find legislators or executive branch officials in
favor of waste, fraud, or (financial) abuse-though (particularly for
the GAO) it is certainly plausible to think that the content and aggressiveness of investigations targeting such problems would change depending on the partisan composition of the legislature and executive
branch.258

On occasion, legislators may find audit bureaucracies useful to
generate publicity and promote policy objectives not related to advancing the ubiquitous mantra of eliminating waste, fraud, and
abuse. 259 Nonetheless, the legislative requests that drive a considerable proportion of the GAO's work (and probably some of the work of
Inspectors Generals' offices) appear to reflect considerable resilience
in the extent to which the audit bureaucracies are viewed as experts in
investigating financial management: who spent what funds, why government vehicles were used for that trip, or why these employees were
asked to work on some questionable task. The same may be largely
true of managers and officials within the agencies themselves. Many
Inspectors General have a background in financial management or
26
accounting, as do a considerable proportion of staff at the GAO. 0

The audit bureaucracies are not entirely devoid of flexibility. It
would almost certainly prove misguided to see the political and organizational constraints on audit bureaucracies as insurmountable, or
their mission as entirely static. Even if they were, there is likely more
than just legislative pressure at work in determining the audit bureaucracies' agenda. Recurring disagreements among legislators almost
257 See, e.g., Seven Years of GPRA: Has the Results Act Provided Results? 106th Cong.
(2000) (testimony of the Hon. Pete Sessions), available at 2000 WL 1211285 ("GAO

has identified waste, fraud and abuse in government programs in amount of over
$800 Billion in the last 5 years.").
258 See, e.g., Anne Margaret Joseph, Political Appointees and Auditors of Politics 8
(May 2002) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Harvard University) (on file with author).
259 See LIGrT, supra note 117, at 44-45 (noting how some "member[s] of Congress ... use ... IG input to frame issues for resolution. However, some members of
Congress have been less concerned with policy reform, using the IGs instead to score
short-term political successes.").
260 Id. at 84-85 (providing a table summarizing the backgrounds of IGs during the

Carter and Reagan adminisrations).
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steadily forging coalitions that would make it possible for them to play
that role.
CONCLUSION

The inexorable logic of executive discretion destines it to carry
risks as well as rewards. Pervasive discretion is what lets government
protect the environment, keep workers safe at industrial sites, and
fight military battles to protect its citizens. But history writes a damning indictment of discretion's abuse. It describes not only how
Nixon's IRS embarrassed his enemies, 270 or how Hoover's FBI
libelously fed speculation that slain civil rights workers were promiscuous and mentally ill subversives, 27 1 but also how even the most determined and virtuous government officials fail to learn from their
mistakes when they don't know they have committed them. None of
this should be surprising given what is known about organizations, the
people who run them, and the complicated legal mandates entrusted
to them.
This Article considered three implications of these facts. First,
judicial review does not constrain the exercise of many forms of executive discretion that would nonetheless almost certainly benefit from
some external review. Regulatory and prosecutorial enforcement decisions are among the most cogent examples. And we do next to
nothing to audit how that discretion is used, despite the presence of
compelling reasons to think that executive branch officials will have a
relentless tendency to frequently misuse that discretion. Because
some discretionary actions can signal competence and resolve to naive
observers among the mass public, executive officials may have an incentive to use their discretion to create favorable impressions. Some
officials or their employees may be far less subtle and engage in willful
misconduct that is unlikely to be detected. Even the most noble officials and organizations may face greater difficulties learning without
external mechanisms to systematically review and critique their work.
If additional resources to monitor high-discretion activities were available, it would be better from a social welfare perspective that we audit
instead of dividing them across an entire pool of cases. Indeed, the
mere presence of judicial review can foment the misleading impression that external review is succeeding in restraining abuse and excess, when in fact the probability of discovering problems may be
close to zero.
270 SeeJames L. Sundquist, Rejiections on Watergate: Lessons for Public Administration,
34 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 453, 456 (1974).
271

See REACHING FOR GLORY 245 (Michael R. Beschloss ed. 2001).
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Second, the conventional focus on traditional judicial review as
the preeminent means of supervising executive branch discretion foments another deceptive impression: that problems with imposing
more stringent judicial review mean executive discretion should be
relatively immune from formal review. When policymaking elites and
organized interests discuss the costs and benefits of executive discretion, they tend to respond by fueling a familiar debate about the value
of greater judicial scrutiny of executive discretion. While this Article
does not dismiss the value of such greater scrutiny, particularly in the
provision of discrete remedies for aggrieved individuals and groups, it
offers an alternative to the polarized rhetoric of that debate. It effectively says: even if one accepts that more stringent judicial review is
impossible, one should not therefore accept that the correct result is
to let the executive branch's wheels keep on spinning as they always
have. The key to that alternative is to recognize that a substantial dimension of the problems associated with policing executive discretion
involves information. Information is what impels the case for audits,
which in turn hold the promise of severing the connection between
the perceived costs of encroaching on discretion (both in terms of
direct review costs and in terms of interference with the valuable characteristics of discretion) and the stringency of review. Indeed, government powers to inspect, fine, prosecute, enforce, and detain may
rightly seem less threatening if their use can be effectively monitored
through audits or similar procedures.
On the other hand, it may seem at first as though audits would
only work if we lived in a world perfect enough to make them unnecessary in the first place. But the institutional design problems associated with auditing executive discretion call for an altogether subtler
diagnosis. Instead, four dynamics help explain that continuing embrace ofjudicial review, and the concomitant absence of activity auditing targeted discretion. When lawyers and policymakers erase the
distinction between targeted discretion and broader policy judgments,
Lhey unduly restrict the scope of options available to help balance discretion's benefits and costs. Though not invariably, this state of affairs
often proves acceptable for presidential administrations, executive officials, and legislators supporting executive power: they will tend to be
perfectly satisfied allowing that power to evade more frequent review.
Somewhat counterintuitively, advocates of restraining that power may
also have incentives to oppose audit-like approaches as a matter of
political strategy, because it lets them sound the alarm to their supporters while they fight for more aggressive review across the board.
That fight happens in a context permeated by persistent (yet ultimately misleading) norms about the appropriate relationship between
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adjudication and review of executive discretion, and similarly durable
conceptions of what existing auditors should do when they supervise
government agencies. Weakening these dynamics may require propitious circumstances and Herculean feats of advocacy, but not the "perfect world" that would let us dispense with audits (or, indeed, judicial
review) altogether. In the course of navigating the imperfect world in
which law actually operates, the possibility of auditing executive discretion can be treated as a problem of institutional design. The discussion thus engendered can encompass questions about who should
audit, how large samples should be, what standard should be used, or
what should be the universe of cases to audit.
Third, a discussion of auditing serves a more immediate function-by demonstrating how arguments for broad discretion are often
radically underdeveloped. Cogent arguments in favor of limiting interference with executive discretion should not herald the end of a
discussion, but its beginning. There remains the task of balancing
benefit against costs, and deciding on the institutional rules that
should govern the relationship between courts, agencies, audit bureaucracies such as the GAO and Inspectors General, legislatures, and
external interests. As one viable approach to structuring those institutional rules, audits help elucidate the conceptual murkiness of common arguments that favor broad executive discretion without
considering how to enhance mechanisms producing information
about executive branch performance. If executive discretion is to be
defended coherently, the case for it ought to transcend reflexive critiques of judicial supervision, or veneration of a political process whose
very impact is contingent on institutional mechanisms to evaluate bureaucratic performance.
It should be self-evident that the existence of broad discretion is
not synonymous with poor bureaucratic performance. When coupled
with an appropriate mix of external political constraints and intrinsic
personal motivations, such discretion can produce a harvest of valuable activity from regulatory, criminal justice, and national security bureaucracies. What borders on madness is to assume that executive
decisions of such profound importance-such as whose assets to
freeze, whom to indict, or against whom to enforce environmental
regulations-will routinely advance some defensible conception of societal interests when existing law lets them so readily elude scrutiny.
In effect, the challenge of calibrating the law's relationship to bureaucratic discretion constantly reiterates a set of complicated institutional
design questions about the use of public power. Arguments for executive power that ignore the subtleties of institutional design become
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